backing. The question is thus put as to how one could legitimately locate
hermeneutic signifi cance at such a point. Can something so unreal that it
exists only as a defi nition form the basis for a “theory of meaning”? My
argument at this point recalls Sextus Empiricus’s suit against the Stoic
claim that expressions “separate from the signifying voice” have existence
in themselves (see Against the Logicians 2.75–76). 32 Hirsch made much
the same point when he wrote that there “is no magic land of meanings
outside human consciousness.” 33
If my argument holds, then it is obvious that any position that includes
textual meaning as a part of the object of hermeneutics has to answer for
an unnecessary multiplication of entities. How does one justify treating
textual meaning as an object of hermeneutics when there is no reason
to regard textual meaning as real? Following on this line of questioning,
some might think that any and all schemes that confi ne themselves to
authorial intention and readerly understanding are justifi ed in their her-
meneutic approaches. But that is not the case. Any approach that views
Meaning as a combination of what the author intended and what the
reader understood faces the same problems, as the notion of combining
authorial intention with anything else does not really identify Meaning
with the author’s intention but rather looks upon it as a semantic dupli-
cate of that intention—a Doppelganger of sorts. Those propounding the
schemes I have in mind do not really believe that the author’s intention
loses its own identity qua intention, to become a new substance (like
H 2 O). Nor do they suppose that the reader’s understanding loses its iden-
tity qua understanding. Rather, they seem to think of the product of the
supposed combination of intention and understanding as a sort of tertium
quid standing over against intention and understanding. Thus we are back
to the problem of multiplying entities unnecessarily. 34 If the hermeneut
objects and says that he or she does think that intention and understand-
ing lose their identity ( qua intention and understanding) in the process
of interpretation—which would be a very odd claim—we then would be
faced with a curious understanding of what intention is.
In short, I do not think it would be a case of “interpretive gerryman-
dering” to privilege those hermeneutical schemes that keep their distance
from unrealities , and I have tried to show that the only schemes that meet
this criterion are those that identify Meaning exclusively with authorial
intention, on the one hand, and those that identify it exclusively with
readerly understanding, on the other hand. 35 Left with those two choices,
the decision, I think, is an easy one. As Félix Martínez Bonati asks, “If we
do not direct ourselves to searching for the original meaning, why should
THERE IS NOTHING OUTSIDE THE INTENTION: ADDRESSING “MEANING”... 75