uses Jacques Derrida’s view of the difference that persists between
gifts and economic exchange.^54 All these theorists make an important
and valid point in their claim that the so-called‘identity politics’
obtaining through recognitive processes cannot simply replace trad-
itional politics and that issues of economic justice and fair distribution
of goods continue to be urgent. Honneth, on the other hand, criticizes
Foucaultian postmodernists because their concept of freedom as
self-articulation neglects the social and intersubjective dimensions
of freedom.^55 Honneth does not want to neglect the dimensions of
social welfare and equality but claims that they are closely connected
to the basic psychology of recognition.
While Thomas Bedorf helpfully identifies the‘recognitive differ-
ence’, we need to ask whether all processes of recognition inevitably
lead to misrecognition. For the purposes of this study, Bedorf is
instructive because he clearly defines the recognition process in
terms of a three-place argument that resembles anthropological gift
exchange. The event of‘recognizing as’is a gift transferred from the
giver to the recipient. Whether this gift inevitably changes the status
of the recipient is, however, a matter which needs to be discussed
separately (cf. 4.2).
The most familiar theories of recognition, in particular those of
Honneth and Ricoeur, stem from continental European philosophy.
Their reception in analytical philosophy has recently led to a greater
differentiation among various processes of recognition. I will illumin-
ate this trend through focusing on the work of Arto Laitinen and
Heikki Ikäheimo. Laitinen claims that one must distinguish between
two basic accounts of recognition. In the so-called adequate regard
insight, a person can unilaterally recognize other people or ‘any
possessors of normative features’; for instance, study credits or reli-
gious practices. The regard with which something is recognized can
be more or less adequate depending on the sensitivity towards that
‘something’.^56 We see here a slight difference from Bedorf’s view in
that while both think that recognition can be unilateral and misrec-
ognition occurs commonly, Laitinen considers that an adequate
regard is nevertheless possible.
The second basic account for Laitinen is the so-called mutuality
insight, assuming that people recognize other people and that both
(^54) Bedorf 2010, 160–9. (^55) Bankovsky & Le Goff 2012, 34–5.
(^56) Laitinen 2008, 337–8.
Introduction 17