sides recognize one another in this process. This is the most common
point of departure shared by Hegelian and phenomenological philo-
sophers. Laitinen emphasizes, however, that it is misleading to treat
all forms of recognition as mutual. The mutuality insight is in fact
restricted in its scope since it does not allow for unilateral recogni-
tions or for recognizing non-personal normative facts. Although the
mutuality insight is in some sense‘fuller’, it is also more restricted in
its scope.^57
Laitinen discusses the issue of whether adequate regard is a merely
descriptive identification. He denies this, arguing that‘an element
of motivationally involved acknowledgement of the normative sig-
nificance’always characterizes recognition. However, this does not
reduce the importance of correct descriptive characterization, an
essential part of adequate regard, although this regard also involves
normative acknowledgement.^58 We may think, for instance, of the
event of legal recognition. The correct characterization of a legally
recognized person is extremely important, although legal recognition
also involves normative acknowledgement. Distinctions between uni-
lateral and mutual recognition and between their descriptive and
normative features are important when we approach the historical
sources that contain some but perhaps not all of the components of a
full-fledged modern view of mutual recognition. Laitinen’s conclu-
sions have some resemblance to Ricoeur’s historical account: for
instance, Ricoeur’s talk of recognition as identification has some
points of connection with the adequate regard insight.
Laitinen asks further whether both individuals and groups are
constituted in a process of recognition that is similar in both cases.
He calls this‘the Ambitious View’, which he thinks Hegelian theorists
often support. While Laitinen remains close to the ambitious view, he
claims that the constitution of groups is more complex than the
recognitive constitution of individuals. For group agency, it is not
sufficient that the members of a group have been socialized through
processes of recognition. In addition, groups need further institution-
creating acceptance as well as normative rules.^59 At the same time, the
Hegelian mechanisms of recognition remain essential.^60
Laitinen employs a working definition to distinguish between
acknowledgement and recognition:‘Acknowledgement of reasons,
(^57) Laitinen 2008, 318–22, 337–8. (^58) Laitinen 2008, 332.
(^59) Laitinen 2011, 310. (^60) Laitinen 2011, 340.
18 Recognition and Religion