such as recognizing the truth or recognizing baptism, can be pro-
ductively analysed either in terms of (ii) acknowledgement pertaining
to facts (recognizing the truth) or in terms of (2b) institutionally
mediated recognition of persons (those who are baptized are recog-
nized as church members).
Obviously, interpretative effort is nevertheless needed. For instance,
‘recognizing the truth’may sometimes mean accepting Jesus Christ as
Lord in religious language (cf. 2.1); in such cases, upward personal
recognition overlaps with impersonal acknowledgement. While
one can debate whether a distinction between impersonal acknow-
ledgement and personal recognition works in all contexts, it gives
considerable weight to the claim that recognition involves persons.
For instance, it would be strange to recognize baptisms, ministries, or
the creedal texts of a religious group without any regard to the people
belonging to this group. At the same time, religious recognition may
nevertheless not only consist in the recognition of persons, since it may
be equally strange to say, for instance, that we approve of your creed
because we recognize you as persons.
The conceptual tools provided by Ikäheimo and Laitinen are heur-
istically important for the adequate understanding of different species
of recognition (cf. 4.5). The analytical discussion of recognition is
many-dimensional and sometimes integrated with the comprehen-
sive social philosophy of Raimo Tuomela and John Searle.^66 I will not
pursue this discussion in more detail, but will use analytical tools for
defining the historical components of the‘concept and conceptions’
of recognition (1.4). Before that, however, we need to look at some
new theological studies dealing with recognition.
1.3. Recognition in Current Theology
Issues of recognition are increasingly discussed in current theology.
For the most part, however, scholars take over ideas from Honneth,
Taylor, or Ricoeur and employ them in discussions of other topics.
While this is an entirely legitimate procedure, it does not shed new
light on the phenomenon of religious recognition as such. For this
(^66) Especially in Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2011. Searle 2010; Tuomela 2008.
20 Recognition and Religion