a contest of beneficence 97
these recipients thirty- six received less than 0. 1 percent of the Norwe-
gian aid budget (most of them getting less than 0. 025 percent each). Only
twenty of the 117 received aid that approached 1 percent of the allocated
funds (Van der Veen 2000 , 208 ).^11
Another possible solution to the collective action problem of prosocial-
ity follows Axelrod’s ( 1984 ) classic analysis of reciprocity (see also Axelrod
and Keohane 1985 ; Oye 1985 ; Keohane 1986 ; Bendor 1987 ; Peterson 1993 ;
Sahlins 1972 ). Put simply, actors may participate in “other- help” with the
expectation of receiving some corresponding assistance in the future. In
essence this is an explanation that sees prosociality as a form of exchange,
or even bribery (Glazer and Konard 1996 ; Morgenthau 1962). Reciprocity
can work directly or indirectly. Direct reciprocity assumes that an actor
assists another in expectation that this specific recipient will offer future
assistance in return. This suggests that Canada sent its forces to help ame-
liorate the tension between Israel and Egypt in 1956 with the expectation
that these countries would send similar forces if Canada finds itself in
a similar pickle in the future. Alternatively, Canada may have expected
better trade relations, more responsiveness to its policies and needs, or
some other forms of tangible reciprocal benefits. Yet the expectation for
direct reciprocity is especially problematic in the international context.
Many attributes of international actors are quite stable — it is difficult to
imagine Sweden moving from a donor status to that of a foreign aid recipi-
ent in the foreseeable future. In a similar way, Canada is unlikely to re-
quire the good services of Egyptian peacekeeping forces anytime soon.
Even under a looser conceptualization of direct reciprocity it is not always
clear what the recipient can provide as a compensation. It is doubtful that
Mongolia’s decision to participate in MINURSO was motivated by an ex-
pectation of greater leverage vis- à- vis the Western Saharans. The indirect
reciprocity variant expects other members in the system to provide the
payback. According to this argument, Canada helped Israel and Egypt,
expecting other members to come to its aid in the future if need arises.
Indirect reciprocity quickly collapses into a collective action problem.
Upholding the promise of indirect reciprocity is a collective good, and en-
forcing such commitments requires significant investment in prosociality
(Keohane 1984 ; Guisinger and Smith 2002 ). Why should any third coun-
try volunteer to help Canada as a payback for assisting Egypt and Israel
in 1956?
Most importantly, understanding prosociality as a form of collective
good cannot explain the occurrence of contests of beneficence. If the goal
