a contest of beneficence 103
principle in order to develop an explanation for altruism. They argue that
altruistic behavior helps establish the pecking order within social groups
(Zahavi and Zahavi 1997 , chap. 12 ). Alden Smith and Blige Bird’s ( 2000 )
study of turtle hunting patterns among the Meriam Islanders finds no evi-
dence of reciprocity as an explanation for prosociality and instead sup-
ports a model that views prosociality as a source of rank and prestige.
Similarly, in his seminal study of the Kula Ring of the Trobriand Islands,
Malinowski ( 1932 , 60 – 61 ) describes puzzling practices of local proso-
ciality: farmers do not enjoy the fruits of their labor and instead divert
75 percent of the crops to their sisters’ families or to the local chief. What
then drives the farmer to invest in the quality of his crops? The food is ex-
hibited publically in ornate displays before it is gifted and consumed. The
locals visit the gardens to observe the quality of the gifts, and prestige is
bestowed accordingly. Interestingly, a commoner faces serious risks if his
prosocial food display surpasses the display of the chief. For Malinowski,
prosociality is tightly connected to prestige and power. Gurven et al. ( 2000 )
find that Ache households in eastern Paraguay get more than 70 per cent
of their food through sharing with others. Those able to contribute more
than their share gain prestige. Similarly, studies of early modern Europe
find strong connections between patterns of conspicuous hospitality and
class distinctions (Heal 1964 ; Thomson 1993 , 19 – 21 ). Finally, an archeo-
logical study of Central America leads Clark and Blake ( 1996 , 276 ) to
conclude that patterns of prosociality were the main engine that led to the
creation of stratification and hierarchy in those societies.
Other studies focus on cross- cultural variance in participation in pro-
social behavior. Wetherell ( 1982 ) finds higher levels of generosity toward
the out- group among Polynesian children when compared with groups of
European children. Mercer ( 1995 , 224 ) suggests that what Wetherell ob-
served might not be a lack of competitiveness but rather a contest of benefi-
cence. De Cremer, Snyder, and Dewitte ( 2001 ) focus on actors’ willingness
to contribute to the provision of public goods. They find that donors are
more likely to donate when their donations are visible and identifiable.
Interestingly, Van Vugt and Hardy ( 2010 ) find that donors are more likely
to donate when the public good they are contributing to is unattainable.
More prestige is bestowed on actors that contribute to such unachievable
goals. However, donors are less likely to support pointless goals if their do-
nations are inconspicuous. These counterintuitive findings follow the logic
of conspicuous consumption and provide a good description of many un-
productive prosocial endeavors in international relations.
