The Price of Prestige

112 chapter four

Japan, upon which were imposed severe limitations on its ability to use vi-

olence, was forced to search for alternative venues for capability demon-

stration. Consequently, in absolute terms, Japan offers the second largest

aid program in the world. Suzuki ( 2008 ) finds strong connection between

Japanese (and Chinese) participation in UN peacekeeping operations and

its quest for great- power status. He concludes that powers that fall just short

of the great- power mark, what he terms “frustrated powers,” can turn to

prosociality and contests of beneficence in order to gain recognition. Sta-

tus competitions, therefore, are not always fought through violent conflict.

Consequently, middle powers, which match Suzuki’s frustrated powers

definition, are among the most likely candidates to be attracted to con-

tests of beneficence. Middle powers are not strong enough to use force in

order to compete with great powers, yet they are strong and rich enough

to seek ways to differentiate themselves from the rest of the pack. Since

middle powers are structurally constrained in their ability to use force as

a venue for conspicuous consumption, they have an incentive to advocate

prosociality as an alternative index of international social hierarchy. A

contest of beneficence is, therefore, an attractive venue for such powers.

A closer look at the connection between prosociality and class can shed

some more light on the role of middle powers as international altruists.

Class and Patterns of International Prosociality

In their respective studies of relative income, Duesenberry ( 1949 ) and

Frank ( 1985 a) find that the cost of conspicuous consumption weighs more

heavily on poorer actors, forcing them to consume higher fractions of their

income.^19 American donations to foreign aid and food aid are a good ex-

ample of this pattern. While the United States is by far the biggest donor

in absolute terms, it is among the most miserly in relative terms. Contests

of beneficence force lower- ranking donors to bear heavier economic bur-

dens. Correspondingly, Round and Odedokun ( 2003 ) find that when de-

fined in absolute terms, aid flows show progressivity in relation to donor

income. However, in relative terms the share of national income devoted

to aid decreases with donor size. This tension between absolute and rela-

tive terms is identical to the one predicted by Dusenberry’s and Frank’s

relative consumption model. Similarly, Bobrow and Boyer ( 1997 , 741 ) find

that, contrary to the expectations of the hegemonic stability and public

goods theories, poorer countries bear more of the financial burden of UN

peacekeeping than richer countries. The failure of Olson and Zeckhauser’s