a contest of beneficence 113
( 1966 ) exploitation hypothesis, which predicts that smaller countries are
likely to exploit greater powers when jointly producing collective goods,
is especially interesting in this context, since peacekeeping seems to be
aimed at improving public welfare. If anything, in the case of international
prosociality, it is the great powers who are doing the exploitation and rela-
tive free riding.
This heavier burden is likely to be tolerated as long as it proves to be an
effective instrument of invidious comparison, that is, as long as it remains
expensive enough to deter small powers from joining the donors’ club. The
literature on middle powers is very instructive on this aspect of prosociality
(Behringer 2005 ; Michaud and Belanger 2000 ; Holbraad 1984 ; Pinchaud
1966 ; Mackay 1969 ; Wood 1988 ; Pratt 1989 , 1990 ; Chapnick 2000 ; Stairs
1998 ; Gelber 1945 ; Ravenhill 1998 ; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993 ; Van
der Westhuizen 1998 ). Much of the theoretical work on middle powers is
written from a Canadian, Australian, or Nordic point of view. The literature
tries to formulate a theoretical justification for claiming a distinct character
and special role for middle powers in the international system. It describes
a series of conspicuous political and diplomatic efforts to institutionalize a
special international position for middle powers. At times, this literature
reads like an analytical exercise in invidious comparison. It is interesting
to observe the significant role played by prosociality in both the theoretical
and diplomatic discourse on middle powerhood.
One of the most assertive attempts to institutionalize middle- power
status in the international system was taken by the Canadians during the
negotiations on the structure of the nascent United Nations at the end
of World War II. The Canadians demanded a special role in the United
Nations for middle powers in recognition of their contribution to inter-
national peace and stability. Other countries joined the Canadian initia-
tive and self- identified as middle powers. This impromptu middle- powers
group included Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, the Netherlands, Yugo-
slavia, Poland, Belgium, and Sweden (Neack 1995 ). Middle powers did
not see themselves as middle in the sense of being close to the mean but
rather as being near the top. They consequently wanted to distance them-
selves from the bottom (Mackay 1969 , 138 ). The middle-powers initiative
was therefore a blatant case of invidious comparison. Chapnik’s ( 2000 ,
188 ) assessment of the Canadian effort reaches similar conclusions: “Can-
ada’s status as a middle power is a myth. The history of middle powerhood
uncovers a tradition... crafted to justify the attainment of disproportion-
ate influence in international affairs.”
