The Price of Prestige

126 chapter five

Science was used to define projects that “required large scale organization,

massive commitment of funds, and complex technological systems” (Cap-

shew and Rader 1992 , 4 ). Most of these projects are run by nonacademic

administrations, tend to be technology driven, and most often include a spe-

cific end goal rather than open- ended investigation (Giudice 2012 ). Very

few entities, other than the state, control enough resources to support the

scale, extravagance, and complexity of Big Science. The resulting depen-

dency on state funding turns Big Science into a deeply political phenome-

non and forces Big Science entrepreneurs to master techniques for securing

political support. The media often play an important role in consolidating

this support. In fact, media hype is almost a necessary characteristic of Big

Science (Capshew and Rader 1992 , 5 ). Science must be conspicuous to be

“Big.”^2

The need for media hype tends to push Big Science toward spectacular

projects, often at the expense of their functionality (Brooks 1971 ). For ex-

ample, the originators of the infamous Mohole Project wanted increased

funding for the earth sciences. They looked for “projects... which would

arouse the imagination of the public... the perfect antianalogue of the

space probe.”^3 In order to guarantee governmental support for the Mohole,

proponents fabricated a frantic Cold War race to the earth’s mantle. They

opted for a grandiose project that resulted in a colossal failure (Greenberg

1967 , 174 – 77 ). Similarly, Bruce Murray, the director of California’s Jet Pro-

pulsion Laboratory (JPL), looked for projects with “pizzazz” as a way of

securing federal funds when he took over the laboratory in 1976. Projects

that could attract public interest and enthusiasm were dubbed “purple pi-

geons,” and projects that were scientifically sound but lacked public appeal

were termed “gray mice.” Murray spent his time and energy promoting

purple pigeon projects, often by exaggerating their international appeal

(Logsdon 1989 ). These types of purple pigeon projects led Big Science critic

Daniel Greenberg to develop the fictional character Dr. Grant Swinger,

who worked for the Center for Absorption of Federal Funds (Greenberg

1966 ). Yet Cold War Big Science politics, at times, seemed to surpass even

the mythical fund- siphoning abilities of Dr. Swinger.^4

The expense of Big Science ensures that only a handful of actors can

afford such endeavors. Hence, Big Science can serve as a credible costly

signal for actors’ capabilities. Big Science is therefore an attractive sta-

tus symbol: it is exclusive, it requires significant cultivation, it is prohibi-

tively expensive, and it is highly conspicuous (Goffman 1951 ). Moreover

it is associated with qualities such as advanced technological capabilities,