The Price of Prestige

big science and the transits of venus 127

industrialization, and modernity, which are valued by contemporary inter-

national society (Goffman 1951 ; Eyre and Suchman 1996 ; Barnett and

Wendt 1992 ; Fox 1968 ). This opens the way to spending competitions. In-

deed, the notion of international competition seems to be an almost inher-

ent part of Big Science. It is no wonder that many observers use sports

metaphors to describe such projects. Once a project is framed as a “race” it

becomes part of a zero- sum game that has to be won regardless of cost. Ap-

peals for governmental funding often draw on sentiments of patriotism and

nationalism by framing the competition as a challenge to national prestige

(Whelan 1968 ).^5 In 1960 , George V. Allen, the director of the US Informa-

tion Agency, appeared before the House Science Committee to justify the

space program. His words clearly echo this sentiment.

Our space program has an importance far beyond the field of activity itself, in

that it bears on almost every aspect of our relations with people of other coun-

tries and on their view of us as compared with the USSR. Our space program

may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability to compete with

a formidable rival, and as a criterion of our ability to maintain technological

eminence worthy of emulation by other peoples. (Knorr 1960 , 579 )

Allen’s statement captures much of the logic of conspicuous consump-

tion. He refers to the space program as a signal of capabilities, vitality,

and competence. The target of this signal is not the USSR alone but in-

ternational society more generally. Similarly, when advocating for a space

exploration of the Comet Halley, which was expected to approach Earth in

1986 , Bruce Murray expressed “personal horror of the thought of a num-

ber of other nations of the world carrying out national exploration of Hal-

ley and the U.S. not involved.... That prospect can hardly be regarded as

anything other than the conspicuous end to what has been a completely

unblemished record of U.S. leadership in planetary exploration” (Logsdon

1989 , 270 ). Here again, Big Science is justified in competitive international

terms and is associated with questions of leadership and rank. Elzinga

( 2012 ) finds that the internationalization of scientific projects through the

invocation of a global competition was one of the hallmarks of Big Science

during the Cold War. Interestingly, he argues that internationalization

remains an important facet of Big Science even after the end of the Cold

War, this time invoking collaboration rather than competition.

Big Science therefore depends on interplay between domestic and

international politics. Domestic support for these behemoth projects is