The Price of Prestige

128 chapter five

dependent on expectations for gains on the international level. Big Sci-

ence is often described explicitly as a tool for gaining international pres-

tige, and hence even groups that are not usually interested in astronomy,

biology, or the nature of the “Mohorovicic discontinuity” can still find

such projects appealing (see also Nelson 1977 ). When domestic incentives

reinforce international pressures for conspicuous waste, the outcome is

often a potent political amalgamation that can topple many checks and

balances. It should therefore not surprise us that Congress provided more

funds for the space program than either the White House or the scientists

dared to request (Lakoff 1974 ). Interestingly, investment in Big Science

does not signal a broad commitment to scientific research. In fact, the

United States trails other industrialized powers in civilian R & D budget

as a percentage of GNP (Solingen 1993 , 38 ). Extravagance does come at

a cost.

This symbiotic web of government, media, and science is often a source

of concern for scientists.^6 Many question the effect of Big Science on the

prioritization of scientific projects. Gomory ( 1992 ) differentiates between

“real” science megaprojects and those that are not. “Real” science proj-

ects, such as the Hubble space telescope, are scientifically beneficial. Yet

even then, “the question is: is this the right way to prioritize and spend

our science money.... And historically the individual investigator has

been much more productive” (Gomory 1992 , 81 – 82 ). As Hoyle ( 1964 )

argues, scientific progress has traditionally been achieved through big

ideas rather than through Big Science. Nonscience megaprojects are not

motivated by scientific curiosity but rather by a sense of competition: “we

did put people on the moon, and we did it to surpass the Soviets, not

to settle the question of what the surface of the moon looks like” (Go-

mory 1992 , 82 ; see also Weinberg 1961 ). Over half of NASA’s budget over

the years has been devoted to manned space missions. Such missions are

conspicuous and expensive. They are also of questionable scientific utility

(Friedman 1996 ).^7

While the United States can probably afford the liability of expensive

projects, Big Science is much more burdensome for less affluent countries.

Big Science is especially striking in such countries, where large- scale proj-

ects can consume a substantial percentage of national development bud-

gets (Steinberg 1987 ). The cost of Brazil’s nuclear and hydroelectric proj-

ects, for example, accounted for a large portion of Brazilian governmental

investment in the 1970 s and 1980 s and contributed significantly to the mas-

sive Brazilian external debt. India’s investment in development- relevant