154 chapter six
prestige, or the material returns generated by prestige is likely to produce
unsatisfactory results. Many researchers have found this to be an intracta-
ble problem and consequently abandoned the study of prestige altogether.
Yet our inability to quantify prestige does not mean that we cannot study
it in a systematic way. Instead of trying to measure prestige directly, we
can gain traction by focusing on the implications of prestige- driven behav-
iors such as conspicuous consumption. As long as actors believe that pres-
tige matters, it should affect their behavior with observable effects. This
is precisely the motivation behind the study of conspicuous consumption.
By understanding political decisions as acts of consumption, this Veb-
lenian approach opens the door to the application of basic economic mod-
els such as supply and demand or consumption externalities to interna-
tional relations. By differentiating between the primary and secondary
utilities of consumption and identifying their respective relation to cost,
conspicuous consumption highlights the way in which social and material
motivations interact and comingle. Finally, by analyzing consumption de-
cisions, the theory underlines the substitutability of many policy decisions
(Starr 2000 ; Most and Starr 1989 ). Actors can choose different commodity
bundles in order to satisfy their needs. Thus, consumption decisions can-
not be taken for granted. Just as there are many combinations of goods
that can satisfy hunger, there is more than one commodity bundle that can
generate greater security. The presence of substitutes allows actors to use
their consumption decisions as a form of social communication. They can
utilize expensive goods as costly signals, opt for symbolic goods to gain
access to an exclusive club, or demonstrate class membership through the
adoption and cultivation of specific tastes.
Ignoring the possibility that states engage in acts of conspicuous con-
sumption impoverishes our theoretical account. It can also lead to prob-
lematic policy prescriptions. The following example illustrates this point
analytically. In his seminal rationalist analysis of war, Fearon ( 1995 ) notes
that wars pose a thought- provoking puzzle for rationalists: if wars are
costly, deadly, and unwanted, why do they recur?
As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient
ex post — both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the
same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs). This
is true even if the costs of fighting are small, or if one or both sides viewed the
potential benefits as greater than the costs, since there are still costs. Unless
states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, as a consumption good, then
war is inefficient ex- post. (Fearon 1995 , 383 – 84 )