The Price of Prestige

conclusions 161

generates a trap: “Was it not bad form to think about good form? His vi-

tals were tortured by this problem.... Good form without knowing it... is

the best form of all” (Barrie 1987 , 121 – 22 ). Hook’s paradox is that know-

ingly and visibly adopting prestige policies is decidedly unprestigious —

deliberately striving for “good form” is the epitome of “bad form.”

Following Hook’s paradox, it should not be surprising to find only very

few candid acknowledgments of prestige- seeking behavior. Few actors are

willing to openly admit that a certain policy or act is driven by prestige

considerations. Such an admission is likely to trigger Hook’s paradox and,

in many cases, defeat the purpose of prestige enhancement altogether.

Instead, prestige policies are rationalized as driven by material necessity,

taste, quality, and even aesthetics. Such rationalizations are not necessarily

manipulative but are often a result of the deeply rooted institutionalization

of prestige structures. Indeed, many of the most effective social institutions

operate subconsciously by affecting our preferences and constructing our

lists of needs and wants.

While this social aspect of prestige helps mitigate Hook’s paradox, it

also makes the work of the social scientist more challenging. It reduces

the usefulness of single- case process tracing: the consumer is not likely

to describe her actions as driven by prestige considerations, and, with no

point of reference, assessing the relative weight of primary and secondary

utilities is difficult if not impossible. Consequently, instead of analyzing

the decision- making process of a single act of consumption, we must focus

on more general patterns of consumption. Thus, instead of interviewing

specific consumers who just purchased an expensive Louis Vuitton purse

or a luxurious Rolex wristwatch in order to uncover their rationalization,

we can gain better insights into the workings of prestige by analyzing the

general consumption trends for such goods. Who are the likely consum-

ers? How do they use these luxury goods? Is there change over time?

What is the elasticity of demand? Accordingly, in this book I did not focus

on tracing the decision- making process in an individual state. Instead of

studying why one actor decides to consume certain goods, I traced how

one good is consumed by a class of actors.

Arguing that prestige is not an explicit or even reflective component of

a decision- making process does not mean that it cannot be part of a ratio-

nalist analysis. Many game- theoretical analyses of international relations

involve similar issues. Asserting that democratic institutions are advanta-

geous during crises or conflicts does not mean that those advantages were

a conscious part of regime design or even the crisis- management process