The Price of Prestige

162 chapter six

itself. It is doubtful whether complex models that focus on the strategic

international implications of public speeches by statesmen or opposition

leaders, or the international repercussions of domestic resource alloca-

tion choices, are fully comprehended by decision makers (Fearon 1994 a,

1994 b; Schultz 1998 ; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999 ). Yet such models are

used with regularity in studies of strategic choice. Similarly, most systemic

theories assume the causality of factors that rarely play a conscious part

in a decision- making process. Nevertheless, we feel comfortable assert-

ing that bipolarity played an important role in many aspects of European

post – World War II politics or that Latin American political economy can

be explained through the lens of dependency (Mearsheimer 1990 ; Car-

doso and Faletto 1979 ). Asserting the role of prestige should therefore

not make us less comfortable. As I demonstrate, an analysis of prestige

is not inherently different, and the theoretical and methodological chal-

lenges that it raises are not insurmountable.

Let me add one last point regarding Hook’s paradox. In Barrie’s fable,

the paradox is introduced in order to explain Hook’s vile actions. Faced

with an inescapable social trap, Hook chose to replace prestige with no-

toriety. A rigid social structure that offered no room for mobility and

scorned those who visibly exhibited aspirations for social ascendance left

Hook with little choice. He could either resign himself to enduring life-

long inferiority, which did not match his constitution or ambition, or he

could adopt an antisocial stance, rejecting the social order altogether. Un-

able to secure the prestige of a hero, Hook could still enjoy recognition as

a villain. While Barrie’s psychologizing is obviously simplistic, it does raise

interesting questions. What role do prestige structures play in the case of

international “villains”? What is the potential connection between pres-

tige and notoriety in international relations? Is there a way to preempt

frustrated actors from “going rogue”? These questions warrant further

research.

Living in a Veblenian World

Viewing the world through a Veblenian lens paints a provocative picture

of international relations. If actors care about their position in the in-

ternational hierarchy, they are prone to adopt costly, conspicuous, and

often excessive policies. As such, the conspicuous consumption argument

raises interesting normative concerns. Are we willing to pay the price of