Notes
Chapter One
- For examples of recent works, see Milliken 1996 ; Gilady 2015 ; Onea 2014 ;
Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2013 ; Wood 2013 ; Galasso 2012 ; Wolf 2011 ; Volgy
et al. 2011 ; Welch 2010 ; Wohlforth 2009 ; Wylie 2009 ; Deng 2008 ; Lebow 2008 ; Ford-
ham and Asal 2007 ; Rosen 2005 ; Kim 2004 ; O’Neil 1999 ; Markey 2000. - For example, Veblen ( 1899 ) 1979 ; Frank 1985 a, 1985 b; Bernheim 1994 ;
Andersen 1933 ; Bagwell and Bernheim 1996 ; Basman, Molina, and Slottje 1988 ;
Duesenberry 1949 ; Coats 1954 ; Gruchy 1958 ; Zinke 1958 ; Leibenstein 1950. For a
general review of Veblen’s life and work, see Diggins 1999 ; Dorfman 1934. - Morgenthau similarly sees the main value of modern weaponry for under-
developed countries as driven by prestige considerations: “The provision of jet-
fighters and other modern weapons for certain underdeveloped nations can obvi-
ously perform no military function. It increases the prestige of the recipient nation
both at home and abroad. Being in the possession of some of the more spectacular
instruments of modern warfare, a nation can at least enjoy the illusion of having
become a modern military power” ( 1962 , 303 ). - For a survey of the role of prestige in these early works, see Markey 2000 ;
Lebow 2008. - For notable exceptions, see Morgenthau ( 1947 ) 1960 ; Gilpin 1981 ; Galtung
1964 ; East 1972 ; Wallace 1971. - Reus- Smit 2012 , 528 – 29 ; Fearon and Wendt 2002 , 52 ; Lake 2011 ; Sil and Kat-
zenstein 2010 ; Wight, Hansen, and Dun 2013. - The Practice Turn is an example of this trend (Adler and Pouliot 2011 ).
- See Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2013 ; Johnston 2014 ; Deng 2008 ; Suzuki
2008 ; Larson and Shevchenko 2010 ; Lanteigne 2005 , 28. - For critique and further discussion, see Welch 2010.
- On definitional shortcomings in Lebow’s framework, see Morrow 2010.
- E.g., Alonso- Carrea, Caballe, and Raurich 2002 ; Jo and Lee, 2016 ; Huang