notes to pages 85–91 179
if there was no money. The purpose of having these planes was not to fly combat
missions against any country, but to show other countries in the region our status
of superior wealth” (Bangkok Siam Rat, May 10 , 1998 , 2 ). For a broader overview
of regional arms buildup at the time of the carrier purchase, see Ball 1993 / 1994.
- It is interesting to note that when the United States perceived a disadvanta-
geous balance of power in the distribution of ground forces in Europe during the
Cold War, one of its main responses was to adopt a maritime strategy aimed at
increasing the US Navy to a force of six hundred ships. This case is interesting be-
cause the perceived imbalance with the Warsaw Pact was in ground forces, the al-
leged tank gap (Chalmers and Unterseher 1988 ). Acquiring maritime capabilities
seemed more appealing than acquiring additional ground forces, although the lat-
ter was a cheaper alternative with clearer functional relation to the problem at hand
(Mearsheimer 1986 ). Mearsheimer claims that the United States was operating ac-
cording to an outdated Mahanian view that looks at the sea as the “major arena of
competition.” Yet he does not provide an explanation as to why this view persists.
A prestige- based explanation can offer an additional dimension to Mearsheimer’s
argument. As in the Russian case, it seems that when a power feels that its position
in the international hierarchy is challenged, it finds it appealing to use prestige
symbols in order to demonstrate that it is still capable of supporting its status. - This position tends to resonate with many Chinese. In 1999 , following
NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, for example, there was
a public procarrier campaign. The angry public demanded the construction of a
carrier that could protect Chinese interests abroad. Carrier advocates collected
donations in order to fund this procurement. They were able to collect 11 million
yuan in under a month (Sakhuja 2000 ).
Chapter Four
- All data regarding current UN peacekeeping operations are taken from UN
data for November 2015 as it appears on the UN official site: http://www.un.org
/en /peacekeeping /resources /statistics /. - There are few studies that do address these issues. Neack ( 1995 ), Khanna,
Sandler, and Shimizu ( 1998 ), Shimizu and Sandler ( 2002 ), Suzuki ( 2008 ), Paris
( 2014 ), Coleman ( 2013 ), and Bobrow and Boyer ( 1997 ) try to account for contri-
butions to UN peacekeeping. Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor ( 1998 ), Kosack and
Tobin ( 2006 ), Maizels and Nissanke ( 1984 ), Alesina and Dollar ( 2000 ), Lums-
daine ( 1993 ), De Carvalho and Neumann ( 2014 ), Palmer, Wohlander, and Mor-
gan ( 2002 ), Hook ( 1995 ), Thérien and Noël ( 1994 , 2000 ), Morgenthau ( 1962 ),
Stokke ( 1989 ), Imbeau ( 1988 , 1989 ), Hoadley ( 1980 ), and Van Der Veen ( 2000 ) of-
fer comparative studies of the determinants of foreign aid policies. In addition to
these studies, there is a significant body of literature that analyzes aid policies of