The Price of Prestige

30 chapter one

they would be characterized by high stakes and evident choices.^52 National

security is such a domain. In other words, according to conventional in-

ternational relations theory, national security is the least likely domain to

tolerate conspicuous consumption or to allow actors to diverge from the

dictums of survival in pursuit of elusive social considerations. Conversely,

the Veblenian approach predicts that the significance of national security,

its salience in international relations, and its reliance on positional goods

should render it a magnet for Veblen effects. Hence, when we identify

cases of conspicuous consumption that concern issues of national security,

those cases can serve as important testers for the validity of the theory as

a whole.

In order to explore the role of conspicuous consumption in interna-

tional relations, I focus on three kinds of goods with respect to which

states often make national security consumption decisions: naval vessels,

prosocial endeavors, and large- scale scientific projects. Thus, for the pur-

poses of this study, a case refers to a type of good rather than to a specific

actor. By looking at the demand for a specific commodity, we can better

identify bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects. Each good attracts a small

to medium group of consumers that engage in repeated consumption

decisions. By comparing and contrasting actors’ consumption decisions

concerning a specific good, we can highlight patterns of consumption that

defy the conventional expectations of rationality.

States consume many types of goods. In order to show that conspicu-

ous consumption matters, I chose to focus on goods that affect core issues

of modern international relations. Thus, I look at cases that, prima facie,

should have persuasive primary- utility justifications, especially in the an-

archic, competitive, self- help world of international politics. The case of

weapons procurement stands at the heart of national security decision mak-

ing. These are among the most expensive goods a state can buy, and a wrong

decision can carry significant repercussions. Identifying and explaining

prestige- driven inefficiencies in this competitive environment could bolster

the conspicuous consumption argument. The navy, the most expensive arm

of the military, presents the most extreme case in this respect. Similarly, Big

Science projects, such as space programs, have long been a visible and im-

portant aspect of great- power competition. This was especially true during

the Cold War and may regain salience as the Chinese space program contin-

ues to advance. The visibility and cost of such programs raises the stakes for

these scientific competitions. Here again we may expect a competitive envi-

ronment to generate efficiency and to be inhospitable to the frivolity of con-

spicuous consumption. Finally, prosociality may seem like a less intuitive