explaining conspicuous consumption 31
target for conspicuous consumers. Here actors employ their resources in an
attempt to help others. The benefits of consumption are not enjoyed by the
consumer directly but rather by the recipient of this assistance. Identifying
Veblenian tendencies even among international do- gooders offers a strong
indication of the prevalence and magnitude of conspicuous consumption in
international relations. These three goods are therefore challenging cases
for conspicuous consumption because they generate an environment that
should be inhospitable to the kind of excess predicted by the theory.
In fact, instead of the cautious frugality that we would expect in ex-
pensive and visible policy decisions, in all three cases it is possible to iden-
tify puzzling examples of behavior that can be best explained through the
conspicuous consumption lens. Thus, for each of these goods I focus on
instances of consumption decisions that seem to approach the status of
“pure Veblen goods.” These are not meant as a test of the theory but
rather as a systematic illustration of the phenomenon of conspicuous con-
sumption in international relations as well as a source for further induc-
tive theoretical refinement and development.
While all three goods generate extreme patterns of consumption, they
vary in significant way: they involve varying levels of competitiveness, they
involve different actors in different times, they rely on different bureau-
cratic branches, and they engage different alternative explanations. This
spread of cases ensures that whatever prestige- seeking behavior we iden-
tify is not simply a by- product of the particular dynamics of a single issue
area. In addition, each of the cases allows me to examine and highlight dif-
ferent aspects of the theory. First, whereas procurement and Big Science
involve long- standing status symbols, prosociality involves more recent
and less established ones. The cases, therefore, include goods that are un-
dergoing different stages of their life cycle as prestige symbols. Second, the
three goods also vary in the degree of competitiveness under which they
are consumed: the highly positional world of arms procurement stands at
one end, and the more collaborative sphere of prosociality stands at the
other. Science is an interesting case because it can be both competitive
and collaborative simultaneously. Identifying competitive prestige- seeking
behavior even in collaborative endeavors is interesting. At the same time,
identifying the type of excess that is often associated with conspicuous con-
sumption even in a highly competitive environment is also counterintui-
tive. Thus, the conspicuous consumption argument challenges both ends
of the competitiveness spectrum in different ways. Third, the cases also
involve different levels of expense. In particular, prosocial policies tend
to be cheaper than procurement or Big Science. As such, prosociality is
