status symbols and luxury goods 41
on ornamental clothing (Benhamou 1989 , 35 n 17 ). Since out of control con
spicuous consumption imposed such high social costs, governmental regu
lation was seen as necessary and legitimate.
Generally, there are two types of sumptuary laws: proscriptive laws
(that ban the consumption of certain items) and prescriptive laws (that
dictate appropriate consumption based on class or rank) (Benhamou 1989 ,
27 ). Regardless of the selected approach, most sumptuary laws proved
ineffective over time because of weak enforcement and continuous social
demand for conspicuous consumption. Once one avenue of consumption
was blocked, consumers found new ways to establish (or cross) class dis
tinctions. Consequently, changes in fashion tended to outpace the speed
of legislation (Hooper 1915 ). The fact that sumptuary laws were deemed
necessary already indicates social fluidity and instability. When class dis
tinction is clear and stable, the threat of a spiral of luxuria is less acute. In
a study of the timing of Roman sumptuary legislation, Dari Mattiacci and
Plisecka ( 2010 ) develop a formal model to demonstrate that sumptuary
laws were introduced when there was a mismatch between economic and
political power. Legislators relied on these laws to protect their eroding
influence. Similarly, Benhamou ( 1989 , 34 ) finds that 70 percent of sump
tuary legislation occurred during the Renaissance, a time of great social
upheaval and fluidity.
Even in its heyday, sumptuary legislation often proved an ineffective
instrument of domestic governance. Yet controlling conspicuous consump
tion internationally is even more challenging. First, international politics
lack an overarching authority that could intervene to curb spirals of excess
when those get out of control. Second, restricting conspicuous consump
tion is mostly a public good and thus subject to the problem of collective
action. Third, in the absence of enforcement, a collective agreement to
reduce excess would require cooperation and trust. However, if spirals
of excess are indeed indicative of unstable social hierarchies and status
insecurity, they may occur in times in which cooperation and trust are in
short supply. Nevertheless, while there are no explicit cases of interna
tional sumptuary laws, many international regimes do include a sumptu
ary dimension. For example, the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which
was created to prevent a spiral of procurement, famously prescribes differ
ent patterns of consumption to different classes of states: great powers are
allowed to develop and keep nuclear weapons, while lesser powers must
limit their consumption to nonweaponized nuclear energy. Arms control
agreements, more generally, can be seen as attempts to curb periods of
