The Price of Prestige
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46 chapter two
does not allow for any categorical significance that goes beyond the direct
implications of the distribution of power. Alternatively, Eyre and Such
man ( 1996 , 98 ) suggest that actors try to carve out separate status for
them selves by acquiring distinctive roles: regional power, superpower,
mediator, balancer. Through their investment in conspicuous consump
tion, actors are in essence purchasing and expressing both individual as
well as class identity (Burke 2005 , 68 ). This suggestion that actors gain
certain rights, benefits, and responsibilities based on membership in a
certain class violates Waltz’s assertion that actors are not functionally dif
ferentiated within the international system (Waltz 1979 , 97 – 99 ).^11 Once
we claim that roles, tastes, consumption patterns, and preferences are
affected by class membership, we start allowing for some functional dif
ferentiation in the system, thus moving away from the Waltzian model of
international relations.
What Makes an Effective Status Symbol?
What makes certain status symbols more attractive and enduring than oth
ers? We have already established that status symbols are usually picked
from a recognized menu of power indexes. However, not all indexes evolve
into status symbols. The process through which an indicator is selected and
then translated into a specific act of consumption that can serve as a status
symbol requires further theorizing and elaboration. Eyre and Suchman
( 1996 , 96 ) argue that distinctive and technologically sophisticated weap
ons systems hold greater symbolic value than widespread and mundane
ones. Taken more generally, their argument suggests that status symbols
need to have high “broadcast efficiency” in order to be effective (Gintis,
Smith, and Bowles 2001 , 113 ).^12 Most enduring status symbols in interna
tional relations, therefore, tend to be conspicuous and distinct; they are
easily observable and leave little room for interpretation. O’Neill makes
a similar point when he analyzes the prestige implications of India’s 1998
nuclear test. Responding to dovish Indians’ calls for focusing on economic
development as an alternative vehicle for Indian prestige, O’Neill notes,
“events of social development do not usually explode; they are generally
gradual. A decrease in infant mortality of 1 percent does not make head
lines to ensure that everyone knows that everyone else knows it” (O’Neill
2006 , 19 ). In this sense, for example, an aircraft carrier is a much more
effective status symbol than an expensive and highly sophisticated ballistic
