The Price of Prestige

56 chapter three

Like Zam Zammah, a cannon too large for actual war, or the Ratte, a

tank too heavy for any terrain, the Vasa offers a cautionary tale highlight-

ing the potential tension between size, conspicuousness, extravagance,

and the strategic utility of weaponry. The quest for more decks and more

guns overshadowed basic issues such as proportion and stability. More

time was spent on decorating the ship with royal figurines and symbols

of grandeur than on testing the safety and viability of the ship’s design.

The priorities seemed clear: bigger and more extravagant was by defini-

tion better. All else was deemed of secondary importance. The outcome

was catastrophic and, in true Gatsby fashion, shattered Swedish maritime

aspirations irreversibly.

The sinking of the Vasa is an extreme example. Yet the tensions that it

highlights are still relevant. While today’s flagships are not decorated with

the actual likeness of the sovereign, they are still a symbol of sovereignty

and national pride. The contemporary equivalent of the Vasa is the aircraft

carrier — the biggest and grandest of vessels. Carriers are the flagships of

their respective navies; they usually bear the names of symbolic places,

events, and national heroes, and for the most part, their main role is cer-

emonial. Carriers serve as instruments for showing the flag, as an impres-

sive setting for national celebrations, and in some cases even as popular

tourist attractions. When George W. Bush searched for a backdrop for a

speech announcing the end of major operations in Iraq in May 2003 , he

opted for an aircraft carrier, the sine qua non symbol of American power.

Yet like the Vasa, the aircraft carrier is an extremely expensive symbol.

Procuring and maintaining an aircraft carrier is beyond the reach of most

countries and is a considerable drain on the budgets of those who never-

theless decide they can afford one. Owning a carrier imposes great budget-

ary constraints that often require the cancelation of other procurement

programs and /or the decommissioning of existing vessels, as well as com-

promises on the standards of maintenance and training. Other trade- offs

often involve reducing the number and quality of vessels in the carrier

group, cutting the quality and number of aircraft, and reducing the sophis-

tication of the carrier’s defensive systems, thus compromising the surviv-

ability of the carrier if it ever faces real threat. It is therefore not surprising

that only ten countries currently own aircraft carriers. Three of the carrier

club members, Britain, India and China, are in the midst of an ambitious

carrier construction effort. Not unlike Gustavus II Adolphus, they are fac-

ing a dilemma: what kind of vessel to build? Should they opt for the biggest

possible carrier regardless of cost or should they build a smaller carrier

and compromise on conspicuous consumption?