the aircraft carrier club 57
In order to analyze this dilemma, we must first understand the qualities
that make the aircraft carrier, or the great gunship in the Vasa’s time, such
a prominent and effective status symbol. Analytically, there are two types
of answers to this question: those that rely on primary- utility qualities and
those that focus on secondary utility. Primary utility – based explanations
focus on the inherent strategic value of aircraft carriers, especially as tools
for power projection. According to this interpretation, the carrier is an
effective instrument of power and therefore a credible prestige symbol —
there is truth in advertisement. Deterrence models would mostly focus on
this type of primary- utility interpretation. Conversely, secondary utility –
based explanations focus on the high cost, exclusivity, and conspicuous-
ness of aircraft carriers. According to this approach, the allure of the car-
rier stems not from its usefulness in battle but rather from its ability to
serve as an effective instrument of invidious comparison.
Technological innovations affect the type of warship that is considered
the main carrier of prestige. A hierarchy of naval strength was thought to
be easily inferable from the number of “vessels of prestige,” or ships of
the line, employed by each navy. Modelski and Thompson ( 1988 ) argue
that currently the aircraft carrier and the submarine constitute the top ech-
elon of the world naval hierarchy. The carrier is therefore an expensive
and conspicuous symbol of a most expensive and most conspicuous armed
service.
Yet even a cursory glance at the state of the world’s aircraft carriers
raises serious questions regarding their strategic value. Currently, most of
these grand ships are outdated and inadequately equipped. Even at full ca-
pacity, most carriers are incapable of projecting decisive power that could
justify their cost.^2 Nearly all non- American carriers employ small numbers
of aging planes. Even the advanced jets that are used on American carriers
are less effective than their ground- based, Air Force – operated counter-
parts. Carrier deployment requires lighter jets, which tend to be slower,
carry a lighter payload, and have a shorter range. Even when discount-
ing the cost of the carrier and its escorts, naval aviation is more expensive
than ground- based aviation. The cost of one Super Hornet F- 18 , one of
the mainstays of the American carriers’ air wing, can finance the purchase
of two F- 15 s or three to four F- 16 s, both of which are faster and can carry
heavier payloads and have a longer range.^3 The cost of the 35 - year life
cycle of a carrier including its air wing is $ 65 billion (in 1995 dollars). The
cost of the 35 - year life cycle of a wing of B 2 bombers is just under $ 26 bil-
lion (Wages 1995 ). The cost of four thousand cruise missiles is estimated at
around $ 14 billion dollars (Myers 1991 ). Zhang Zhaozhong of the Chinese
