The Price of Prestige

62 chapter three

When signal selection trumps natural selection, we end up with the Vasa

and the Bismarck.

Moreover, the British and German cases highlight another weakness of

bureaucratic models in explaining conspicuous consumption. Historically,

the British admiralty enjoyed a special position in society, government,

and culture (Morriss 2004 ; Kennedy 1983 b). Accordingly, even in the face

of mounting critiques and political opposition, the admiralty was able to

secure immense investments in naval procurement repeatedly (Weinroth

1971 , 109 ). This was not the case in Germany, which was traditionally more

of a land power than a naval power. Under Hitler, the position of the navy

was particularly weak. Hitler’s main focus was on the army and the air

force. When it came to the navy, he appreciated the role played by subma-

rines but was particularly wary of the German surface fleet. In a 1943 lec-

ture, for example, he even argued that the battleships should be scrapped

and their cannons should be used to protect the shores (Herwig 1988 , 68 ).

And yet despite the marked difference in political influence, both admiral-

ties ended up with a preference for large ships and the budgets required

to procure them. Focusing on the structure and strength of bureaucracy

as the main explanatory variable, therefore, is insufficient. The allure of

the large warship is maintained even across very differently positioned

bureaucracies.

With the notable exception of the Pacific theater during World War II,

large warships played an increasingly marginal role throughout the twen-

tieth century. According to Cable ( 1989 , 18 ), the Falklands War was the

only war since 1945 in which naval power played an essential role. Yet

the allure of the great ship as a symbol of power has not diminished. The

persistent prominence of large ships as the main naval test of status, even

in the face of clear and recent contrary evidence, indicates that there is

something about expensive large vessels that makes them a better instru-

ment of prestige than more efficient, versatile, and cheaper smaller ves-

sels. Kelleher, Mullins, and Eichenber ( 1980 ) find very little variation over

time in the number of large battleships owned by European navies — there

is no elasticity in the demand for this good. This stability was maintained

at times of economic difficulties, rising procurement costs, and significant

geostrategic shifts. The authors conclude that the reason for this stability

was therefore political. Navies were successfully insulated from geopo-

litical and economic pressures by reason of their function as a source of

national prestige.

The age- old practice of gunboat diplomacy is another well- known ex-

ample of the symbolic value of the large ship. In fact, gunboat diplomacy