The Price of Prestige

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the aircraft carrier club 63


still plays an integral part in international affairs. According to Cable ( 1989 ,

44 – 45 ), 1944 was the only year between 1919 and 1989 in which there

were no recorded incidents of gunboat diplomacy; at least twenty- three

states used gunboat diplomacy in the 1970 s. It is widely accepted that

the success of gunboat diplomacy depends not on the inherent power of

the gunboat itself but rather on its symbolic value (Luttwak 1974 , 29 ). The

single gunboat is perceived as a reflection of national power and prestige.

The connection between naval power and prestige is therefore a deep-

rooted one.^7

The navy has traditionally been and still is the most expensive arm of

the military. Consequently, the development of strong naval capabilities

is a costly enterprise that can be successfully executed only by a few coun-

tries. If anything, contemporary naval procurement is more expensive and

exclusive than ever.

Another long- term tendency which is having serious effects on British military
strength is the sheer costliness of modern armaments.... The Dreadnought,
the first British nuclear powered submarine, cost over $ 18 million; a few years
later the Polaris- type boats, such as Resolution, cost $ 40 million but that was
without the missile system. With the latter the cost soared to $ 52. 5 million per
vessel and it would no doubt would have been higher but for American as-
sistance. The aircraft carrier Eagle, which cost $ 15. 75 million when new, was
refitted in the early 60 ’s for $ 31 million.... With each new model the increase in
price is steeper.... The building of a major warship is now impossible without
vast resources. One Trident submarine is estimated at more than $ 1 billion.
(Kennedy 1983 a, 341 )

It is not surprising, therefore, that leading maritime powers tend to be

the principal world powers. Only a great power can tolerate such rap-

idly expanding spirals of excess. Tilly ( 1985 , 178 ) finds a tight connection

between naval capabilities and international rank. Modelski and Thomp-

son ( 1988 ) claim that this has been the case ever since the discovery of the

“new world” in the fifteenth century. Initially, naval capabilities were nec-

essary in order to exploit the opportunities and resources of newly discov-

ered lands. In this early stage there was a tight correlation between naval

capacity and material power. However, once naval power was established

as a credible index of power, it became attractive to aspiring actors for

symbolic reasons as well as for material ones. An impressive navy thus be-

came a prerequisite for great- power status regardless of its actual strate-

gic utility (Booth 1977 , 57 ). Over time, through cycles of exaggeration and
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