the aircraft carrier club 65
Italy was forced to divert resources away from essential components of na-
val power in order to keep up appearances. The growing tension between
form and substance was not sustainable over time. The British, on the other
hand, showed their preference for conspicuousness by deferring to Italian
grandeur even when it should have been quite clear to them that it held
very little substance. This type of seemingly irrational deference is to be
expected in a society with established and enduring symbols of prestige.
These implications of conspicuous consumption can generate provocative
suggestions for naval planners.
In the light of the highly selective nature of political perceptions of naval power,
one might be tempted to advocate ship configurations that emphasize explicitly
the visible variables of naval power at the expense of those that are less trans-
parent... to deploy bigger ships with bigger weapons.... To frighten South
Yemen or encourage the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi one does not need a powerful
sonar under the hull or a digital data system in the superstructure. If the saliency
of political missions (and low intensity conflict) is accorded the priority that
the present state of international politics would seem to warrant, forceplanning
may yet take the path of more visible and less sophisticated sea power. (Luttwak
1974 , 42 – 47 )