The EconomistNovember 2nd 2019 Middle East & Africa 432 prime ministers since Mr Vaz won the pres-
idential election in 2014. Despite huge
amounts of support, including a sizeable
unmission, Guinea-Bissau, a country of
1.8m people dependent mostly on the ex-
port of cashew nuts for foreign exchange,
cannot seem to produce even a vaguely ca-
pable government. It is a lesson in the diffi-
culty of changing deep-rooted systems of
corrupt politics in weak states.
paigc resembles less a political party
than an extended family fighting over a
shrinking inheritance. In the past coups
were incredibly common—the country has
had at least a dozen attempts, with the lat-
est successful one in 2012. Another one
seems less likely now, thanks to the pres-
ence of peacekeepers from other West Afri-
can countries. But political strife contin-
ues nonetheless. For the past four years Mr
Vaz, a member of paigc, has refused to ac-
cept the prime minister appointed by
paigcmembers in parliament, instead pre-
ferring to rule on his own. In the presiden-
tial election Mr Vaz will face off against Do-
mingos Simões Pereira, one of the thwarted
prime ministers, as well as against another
former paigcprime minister, Carlos Do-
mingos Gomes Júnior, and nine other inde-
pendent candidates.
The paigc’s infighting has been com-
pounded by a reliance on corruption to
fund politics. Most prominently that has
involved state complicity in cocaine traf-
ficking from South America through to Eu-
rope. More than a decade ago Guinea-Bis-
sau was named a “narco state” by un
officials because of how deeply drugs traf-
fickers had penetrated its government.
João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, the longest
serving president, was assassinated in
2009 in a feud seemingly linked to drugs
trafficking. In September almost two
tonnes of cocaine were seized by the judi-
ciary police. That followed a seizure of
around 800kg in March, just before legisla-
tive elections. It is all but certain that the
shipments were being protected by a local
political faction. It is also plausible that the
traffickers were betrayed by a rival one.
The presidential election seems unlike-
ly to fix the crisis. Indeed, it may be making
things worse. On October 26th a protester
was killed by police during a demonstra-
tion against the election roll, which non-
paigccandidates say has been manipulat-
ed to benefit the party. What little money
the state has is being looted to buy influ-
ence in the power struggle within the
paigc. Government salaries go unpaid,
says Amadu Djamanca, who runs the Ob-
servatory of Democracy and Governance, a
local ngo. The cashew industry is being
crushed by an export tax that is intended to
fund investment in infrastructure—
though the money raised has gone miss-
ing. Whatever happens, ordinary citizens
seem sure to suffer. 7
E
very windowof the factory on the out-
skirts of Adama is smashed. On the side
of the road are the scorched remains of a
bus and lorries torched by angry young
men last week. This scene of mob violence,
just 75km from Addis Ababa, the capital, is
one that is becoming wearily familiar to
many Ethiopians.
The democratic revolution kick-started
by Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister, last
year has long been bittersweet. The govern-
ment released tens of thousands of politi-
cal prisoners, welcomed back exiled oppo-
nents and promised free and fair elections
in 2020. Last month Abiy won a Nobel
peace prize, for helping end a decades-long
conflict with neighbouring Eritrea. But his
efforts to put his own country on a more
liberal path have been marred by rising vio-
lence and ethnic tensions. The latest kill-
ings suggest it is the transition’s darker
side that is ascendant.
The violence started on October 23rd
after hundreds of young men gathered out-
side the residence of Jawar Mohammed, a
controversial activist who returned to Ethi-
opia last year at Abiy’s invitation. Both men
are Oromos, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic
group, and are popular in the region. But Ja-
war’s supporters, a youth group known as
the “Qeerroo”, took to the streets of Addis
Ababa and other towns after their leader
said he faced a state-orchestrated attempt
on his life. In a post shared with his 1.75m
Facebook followers he said police had tried
to remove his government security detail
in the dead of night. They had resisted.
What followed was reminiscent of prot-
ests in Oromia that helped to propel Abiy to
power. Groups of Qeerroo burned tyres and
blocked roads into the capital. Theymarched, carrying sticks and chanting in
support of Jawar. Shops and businesses
shut. Copies of Abiy’s new book, which
preaches national unity, were set alight.
It soon took a nastier turn. In Adama,
groups of mostly Amhara men (the second
largest ethnicity) confronted the Qeerroo.
Clashes broke out. Vehicles, shops and
businesses were burned. At least 16 people
died. Most were stoned to death. Near Ad-
dis Ababa non-Oromo were killed in un-
provoked attacks.
Spreading violence may now have
claimed as many as 80 lives, says Ethiopia’s
human rights commissioner. Some died in
attacks on churches and mosques, in a
worrying sign that ethnic conflicts risk
turning into religious ones, too.
Underlying the unrest are two trends.
The first is an intra-Oromo power struggle
embodied in the rivalry between Jawar and
Abiy. Jawar, who says he may run in next
year’s election, has loudly criticised the
prime minister’s plan to form a national
party to replace Ethiopia’s ruling multi-
ethnic coalition. On October 22nd Abiy im-
plicitly threatened his younger rival, say-
ing he would “take measures” against me-
dia owners with foreign passports (Jawar is
an American citizen) if they fan instability.
Many Oromos are also angry that Abiy has
not met their demands, which include
making Afan Oromo an official language of
the federal government. “The government
hasn’t done anything for the Qeerroo,”
complains a young man in Adama.
The second cause is competition be-
tween Oromos and Amharas. Since 1995,
when the current constitution established
nine ethnically based regions, politics has
been a battleground between rival nation-
alisms. For much of the past three decades
the Tigrayans, who are about 6% of the pop-
ulation, ran the show.
Now Oromos are in charge, which has
triggered a backlash among Amharic-
speakers and some minorities who fear
that the Oromo nationalism espoused by
Jawar and his followers could lead to mar-
ginalisation. Towns in Oromia with large
Amharic-speaking populations including
Adama and Addis Ababa are especially vo-
latile. Even officials there use dog-whistle
terms such as neftegna (“gun-carrier”)
when talking about Amharic-speakers. In
Adama both sides say that they are arming
themselves in self-defence.
For several days Abiy was silent in the
face of chaos. Since then he has promised
to “weed out” perpetrators. Ending impu-
nity for killers is essential. But so, too, are
talks to defuse tensions, both within
Oromo politics and between the ethnic re-
gions. Jawar says he has asked Abiy to or-
ganise a “national convention” to forge a
compromise. With elections fast ap-
proaching it is a request the prime minister
would be wise to answer. 7ADAMA
Ethnic violence threatens to tear
Ethiopia apartEthiopiaThe clash of
nationalisms
SOMALIASOUTH
SUDAN ETHIOPIAUGANDA KENYASUDANDJIBOUTIERITREARed
SeaAddis
Ababa
Adama
OromiaAmharaTigray300 km