2019-11-09_The_Economist_-_Asia_Edition

18 BriefingMacron’s view of the world The EconomistNovember 9th 2019

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ly saying is: “Wake up!” With America turn-

ing its back, China rising, and authoritar-

ian leaders on the eu’s doorstep, the result

is “the exceptional fragility of Europe”, Mr

Macron concludes, “which, if it can’t think

of itself as a global power, will disappear.”

“What we are currently experiencing,”

he declares, with reference to the with-

drawal of troops from Syria, is “the brain-

death of nato”. Pressed to explain, he ar-

gues: “You have no co-ordination whatso-

ever of strategic decision-making between

the United States and its natoallies. None.

You have an unco-ordinated aggressive ac-

tion by another natoally, Turkey, in an

area where our interests are at stake.” Did

this mean that Article Five—the idea that if

one natomember were attacked the others

would come to its aid, which underpins the

alliance’s deterrence—is still functional? “I

don’t know,” he replies. “But what will Arti-

cle Five mean tomorrow?”

The underlying message is brutal: Eu-

rope has to stop judging these times a his-

torical anomaly, start asking whether nato

is fit for purpose, and get its act together.

This is a view broadly shared by his coun-

trymen (see chart 1). “Even if we don’t want

to hear it,” he says, “we cannot in all re-

sponsibility fail to draw the conclusions, or

at least begin to think about them.”

His business is philosophy

Mr Macron, a philosophy graduate as well

as a former investment banker, is consid-

ered to be more of a thinker than most

world leaders. He tries to read for an hour

or two each day. In Shanghai he slipped off

for a private lunch with Chinese artists to

muse about freedom. Mr Macron’s deliber-

ations have led him to conclude that what

is needed is “European sovereignty”: the

collective ability to defend Europe’s inter-

ests—over security, privacy, artificial intel-

ligence, data, the environment, industry,

trade and so forth—in a strategic way.

During his interview, Mr Macron roams

across topics, moving from a psychological

portrait of Vladimir Putin one moment to

the perils of a low-interest-rate economy

the next. Europe faces an almost-existen-

tial moment, he argues, as the world shifts

from a global order based on rules to one

determined by muscular power politics.

Yet he does not seem to be daunted. He has

a more engaging manner than his aloof

public persona, which has led to a reputa-

tion for haughtiness, would suggest. Mo-

ments such as when Mr Macron told off a

teenager for not calling him “Monsieur” in

2018, or when he said in 2017 that railway

stations were places where “one crosses

people who succeed, and people who are

nothing”, have added to this impression

that he is arrogant and removed. And, in-

deed, the bleakness of Mr Macron’s analy-

sis is matched by an uncanny—and no

doubt excessive—confidence in his own

ability to do something about it.

But can he? French Fifth-Republic pres-

idents are fond of laying out sweeping vi-

sions of the world that appeal to the coun-

try’s grandeur. Over the years, when French

leaders have called for a Europe puissance

(European power), this has often sounded

suspiciously like code for French hege-

monic ambitions. Such efforts in the past

have been dismissed in London or Wash-

ington as quaint, or dangerously under-

mining of nato, or both. In 2003 during the

Iraq war, when France, Germany, Belgium

and Luxembourg held talks on such mat-

ters, their get-together was dismissed as a

second-rate “chocolate summit”.

Yet there are new reasons to try to un-

derstand the thinking in Paris. Mr Macron

is an energetic diplomat, keen to shape the

events he sees unfolding. For at least the

next year, and possibly beyond, he will be

the only ambitious leader of a liberal de-

mocracy who is also at the head of a nuclear

power, with a military presence that

reaches from Europe to the Pacific, a unSe-

curity Council seat, strong executive pow-

ers and a robust parliamentary majority.

Compare this with the agonies of Brexit

Britain, Germany’s dysfunctional coalition

and faltering economy, or the political pa-

ralysis of Italy and Spain.

The result could be that leadership in

Europe could pivot to France. By default as

well as inclination, says Benjamin Haddad

of the Atlantic Council in Washington, dc,

Mr Macron is well placed to become Eu-

rope’s new diplomatic leader.

For sure, Mr Macron cannot compete

with Mrs Merkel on experience. But, mid-

way through his term, the 41-year-old

French president has built up ties to many

world leaders. Since taking office, Mr Mac-

ron has made 101 trips to over 50 different

countries, including places (from Nigeria

to India) outside France’s traditional

sphere. His China trip was his second there

as president. On his watch, Mr Trump has

been four times to France. Even Mr Mac-

ron’s domestic standing has started to re-

cover, having taken a bruising soon after

coming into office. After the searing social

unrest led by thegilets jaunes(yellow jack-

ets) a year ago, his approval rating—still

very low, at 34%—is at least back up to

where it was before the protests began. (Mr

Trump’s is at 41% and over the past three

years has not slipped below 36%.)

Moreover, despite some clumsy foot-

work, Mr Macron has manoeuvred a num-

ber of France-friendly appointees into top

eu jobs. They include Ursula von der

Leyen, the new head of the European Com-

mission; Charles Michel, the incoming

European Council president; and Christine

Lagarde, who now runs the ecb. And France

has secured a hefty new commission port-

folio spanning the single market, industri-

al policy, digital, defence and space—al-

though he failed to secure Sylvie Goulard

for the job, after she became the first

French candidate to be rejected by meps in

Brussels for being unfit to take office.

Some of the language in Europe has

started to shift in Mr Macron’s direction, at

least. Mrs von der Leyen says she wants to

run a “geopolitical” commission. Mark

Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, has ar-

gued that “the eu needs a reality check;

power is not a dirty word.” Mrs Merkel has

told Europeans that, when it comes to their

collective security, “the times when we

could rely on others are over.”

Flown east of the sun

By the third day of his trip, French officials

were pleased that a deal to protect regional

European food labels—such as Roquefort

blue cheese—in China, and vice versa, had

been signed and that China seemed sup-

portive on climate change. But they were

also candid about how difficult it all is.

China is a good test of whether Mr Mac-

ron can get Europe to speak as one voice,

and whether Europe wants that voice to be

Mr Macron’s. He has been outspoken about

“China’s real diplomatic genius for playing

onour divisions and weakening us”. He

says he wants fellow Europeans to be less

naive; he has argued it was “stupid” to sell

essential infrastructure in southern Eu-

rope to the Chinese. He also wants the euto

insist on reciprocity in trade and market

access, and to guard against technology

transfer. To back this up with a show of lim-

ited muscle, France sails at least twice a

Nearly there^2

Source:IISS

Defence spending ,2018,%ofGDP

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.

United States

Britain

Poland

France

Italy

Germany

NATO target

On the defensive^1

Source:ECFR *March 2019

“Where would you rather your country spend its

defence budget - investing in the defence

capabilitiesofNATOor the EU?”, % polled*

0 1020304050

France

Germany

Italy

Poland

NATO EU