The EconomistNovember 9th 2019 BriefingMacron’s view of the world 192 year through the South China Sea.
The need for a credible common policy
sounds sensible. Trying to forge one is a lot
more difficult. Take the construction in Eu-
rope of 5gtelecoms networks. “You have to
grasp the sensitivity of what we’re talking
about,” Mr Macron argues, the pitch of his
voice rising. Europe, he laments, has fo-
cused its technology policy almost exclu-
sively on market issues, such as roaming or
competition, at the expense of strategic
thinking. He thinks Europeans should be
worried that they cannot guarantee that
sensitive technology will be neither Chi-
nese nor American. France is taking a cau-
tious approach to screening investment in
its 5gnetwork roll-out. Despite a warning
from the head of its own foreign-intelli-
gence service, Germany has taken a less re-
strictive approach.
In some matters, the eumay become
more willing to act in what Mr Macron con-
siders to be a strategic fashion. The new
European Commission could be more sym-
pathetic to French desires to apply a global
measure of market power to evaluate in-
dustrial mergers, which would enable pan-
European champions to emerge. The idea
of a sales tax on tech firms, which France
introduced in July, prompting Mr Trump to
tweet angrily about “Macron’s foolish-
ness”, is gaining ground in other countries.
France has persuaded Germany to consider
the idea of a European carbon border tax.
We live in an unsettled time
The really tough part of Mr Macron’s vision,
however, would involve a step change for
Europe that is extremely difficult to see
happening in a hurry. It would mean con-
verting a bloc that uses the heft of its mar-
ket to apply rules and standards—and de-
ploys its defence capability primarily for
the purposes of crisis management—into
one that can project power and act collec-
tively as a military force. “It is very tough,”
Mr Macron concedes, acknowledging that
“Europe hasn’t demonstrated its credibil-
ity yet.” But, he insists, “we’re making pro-
gress” and that “attitudes are changing.”
The French president cites his pet pro-
ject, the European Intervention Initiative, a
coalition of countries (including Britain),
ready to act together in crises, as well as the
German-favoured eudefence co-operation
agreement, known as pesco. He also points
to the hefty new €13bn ($14bn) European
Defence Fund to finance research and
equipment, and a Franco-German agree-
ment for a joint future-generation tank and
fighter plane. All of these, Mr Macron in-
sists, are “designed to be complementary to
nato”. France knows full well from its
counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel
the depth of its reliance on America.
But is Europe really ready to undertake
such a transformation? “I’ve been hearing
about European strategic autonomy for solong,” sighs Philip Gordon of the Council
on Foreign Relations, and formerly an ad-
viser to Barack Obama. Part of the problem
is defence spending (see chart 2, on previ-
ous page). If Europe’s natomembers are to
meet their commitment to spend 2% of
gdpon defence by 2024, this would mean
spending an extra $102bn—some 40%
more than they currently do.
Tougher still is the need for a change of
mindset. Germany remains a defender of
the status quo. This is the case on budget-
ary orthodoxy, which Mr Macron has failed
to influence, as well as the post-cold-war
order, where he detects some change. Ger-
many is “very unambitious on the world
scene, and so a very difficult partner for
France,” says Claudia Major, of the German
Institute for International and Security Af-
fairs, a think-tank. “We constantly feel that
[the French] want something from us, and
that this is so annoying.”
Germany is not alone. In other Euro-
pean capitals there is unease at the pros-
pect of French leadership, and a feeling
that Mr Macron is all for co-operation, as
long as it is on French terms. Such misgiv-
ings were exposed by his recent veto over
the start of accession talks with North Mac-
edonia and Albania. Fellow Europeans
roundly condemned this as exactly the sort
of failure of geostrategic thinking that Mr
Macron accuses others of.
This view infuriates the president. En-
largement without reform of the euand of
its accession rules, he says, is “absurd”. It
prevents Europe from acting as a more in-
tegrated bloc. “Half” of the other eucoun-
tries agree with him on Albania, he claims,
but hide behind France. And he rejects the
idea that his veto leaves them vulnerable to
rival powers, pointing to growing Russian
and Chinese influence in Serbia, which is
an accession candidate. If Europe reformed
first, says Mr Macron, he would be “ready toopen negotiations”.
Or consider Mr Macron’s Russia policy.
He has long argued that rogue powers are
more dangerous when isolated. To this
end, he has hosted Vladimir Putin at both
Versailles, near Paris, and Brégançon, on
the Mediterranean. But his call for a “rap-
prochement” with Russia, in order to keep
it out of China’s arms, has alarmed Poland
and the Baltics. “My idea is not in the least
naive,” argues Mr Macron. He insists that
any movement would be conditional on re-
spect for the Minsk peace accords in Uk-
raine. He has not called for sanctions to be
lifted. And he sees this as a long-term strat-
egy, that “might take ten years”. Mr Mac-
ron’s belief is that, eventually, Europe will
need to try to find common ground with its
near neighbour. Not doing so would be “a
huge mistake”.History holds her breath
The rest of the world is still not quite sure
what to make of the French president.
There is a dizzying amount of diplomatic
activity now coming out of Paris. This has
already led to false hopes, such as the pros-
pect of a Macron-brokered meeting be-
tween the Iranians and Americans. Prom-
ises of four-way talks between Russia,
Ukraine, France and Germany this autumn
have yet to materialise. Not unlike Mr Mac-
ron’s global showmanship and his theatri-
cal handshakes with other world leaders,
his foreign policy is generating both inter-
est and disquiet in almost equal measure.
It may be that despite all this energetic
effort, Mr Macron’s ambitions for “Euro-
pean sovereignty” are frustrated from
within by a combination of European divi-
sions, Brexit, German inertia and lingering
suspicions of the French. Or that his impe-
rious behaviour curtails his influence.
“Macron has everything in place to build a
French-focused Europe,” says Ulrich
Speck, of the German Marshall Fund. “Stra-
tegically he’s right about so much, but op-
erationally he doesn’t work enough with
other partners.” Nor is it even clear that Eu-
rope needs to fill its leadership gap.
Yet, as Mr Macron displayed in China
this week, he will seize the mantle if he can.
The French president may overpromise
and underdeliver. But he is unfazed by
those who accuse him of being pushy or
difficult, judging this to be the inevitable
result of trying to upend the rules. “I’m try-
ing to understand the world as it is, I’m not
lecturing anyone. I may be wrong,” he in-
sists, in a tone that hints he does not be-
lieve it for a second. The leader who de-
scribes such a bleak outlook for Europe is
going to try to do something about it,
whether others like it or not. As one of his
advisers puts it, Mr Macron “is a realist, and
a pragmatist, and he exposes himself by
taking risks. But that’s how he is. That’s
how he became president.” 7