of  identity    offer   an  easy    way out.    There   is  this    photograph  of  a   boy on
horseback.  That’s  me, though  I   haven’t gone    horseback   riding  for decades.    I’m
not essentially an  equestrian, and I   don’t   look    much    like    the boy on  the horse.
Still   it’s    me.
Thus we need criteria that enable us to say that a particular person, x 1 , at one
point in time, t 1 , is the same person as x 2 at another point in time, t 2.
Four approaches
Current philosophical   approaches  that    try to  provide such    criteria    are of  four
kinds:  empiricist  reductionism,   mentalist   essentialism,   ordinary    language
analysis,   and interactionism.
Reductionism    strives to  reduce  all facts   about   personal    identity    to  empirically
researchable    facts   about   bodies, brains, sense   perceptions,    behavioural patterns,
and how these   are interrelated.   Personal    identity    is  somatic,    consisting  of
physical    matter. A   person’s    enjoyment   of  watching    the gulls   in  the sky will
eventually  be  explainable in  terms   of  moving  particles.  Puzzle: what    is  a   person?
Mentalist   essentialism    is  the view    that    minds   (souls) are different   from    bodies;
more    than    that,   they    are the essence of  people’s    individual  identity.   A   variety of
this    view    espoused    by  religious   philosophers    and theologians holds   that    a   soul
can continue    to  exist   after   its body    dies    (e.g.   transmigration  of  souls   in
Hinduism).  Non-religious   philosophers    can only    keep    looking for mental
processes   that    establish   psychological   continuity  from    t 1     to  t 2 .   Religious   thinkers
accept  the mystery of  the soul’s  God-given   nature, as  paradigmatically    does    the
dogma   of  the Catholic    Church. Puzzle: when    and how is  a   body    ensouled?
Ordinary    language    analysts    take    an  altogether  different   approach.   Since   language
is  a   universal   faculty of  humanity    and since   every   known   language    has terms   of
self-reference, they    argue,  the logical reconstruction  of  sentences   in  which   words
such    as  ‘I’ occur   will    help    us  understand  what    self    and hence   personal    identity    is.
The sentence    ‘I  enjoy   watching    the gulls’  is  fine,   while   ‘My body    enjoys
watching    the gulls’  is  odd.    Why?    Puzzle: do  children    lack    an  identity    before  they
know    how to  use ‘I’ correctly?