Interactionism recognizes the existence of mind and body as two distinct but
interacting dimensions of the self, and seeks to overcome the rigid mind–body
dualism that has characterized much of Western philosophy for centuries. Rather
than accepting an unbridgeable gap between corporeal continuity and
psychological continuity, interactionists posit a self-conscious mind able to act
on its brain. In this view, trying to recapture the three-syllable name with initial
L becomes an activity of the self-conscious mind that deliberately controls
neuronal events. Puzzle: with dreams we don’t remember, does the brain side-
step the self-conscious mind’s control when we sleep?
Death and other Harms: When is a Human Being?
At some point, each of the four approaches encounters puzzles, and not just the
ones I mentioned. They illustrate that the question regarding the basis on which
we should claim identity for ourselves and ascribe it to others is one of the most
vexing problems of philosophy. And we have not even touched upon death,
Alzheimer’s, brain lesions that cause personality changes, the consciousness (or
lack thereof) of patients in a persistent vegetative state, schizophrenia, abortion,
euthanasia, gene therapy, organ transplantation, and other events that affect our
identity, more or less drastically. Awareness of our inevitable passing is a
defining characteristic of the human condition, but the beginning and the end of
life are associated with unresolved questions of both science and ethics.
Zygotes cannot be self-aware. Are they nevertheless persons with an identity? If
so, could life insurance be issued for them? What are the implications of
attributing personhood to individual zygotes and embryos for population
statistics? Should we make a distinction between persons that can be counted
and persons that, perhaps, could be counted in principle but not in fact?
Since, we assume, the zygote has no self-awareness or indeed a psyche, there
cannot be psychological continuity between me and the zygote I once was. Since
cells both change and are replaced regularly, there is no physical continuity
either. In order to determine individual identity, we need an individual. Given the
lack of psychological and physiological continuity, it is better to conceptualize
the individual as an open system rather than a thing/organism with an essence
and clearly delineated boundaries. This will make it easier to adjust our concept
of individual identity to our present state of knowledge, although common sense
finds it difficult to dispense with fixed categories. ‘Identity’ above all suggests