Jim_Krane]_Energy_Kingdoms__Oil_and_Political_Sur

(John Hannent) #1

  1. FROM ENERGY POVERTY TO ENERGY EXTREMISM181

  2. According to the Little- Mirrlees Rule, allocative efficiency is achieved when the
    domestic price equals the real marginal opportunity cost, the best estimate of which
    is the world reference price. Ian M. D. Little and James A. Mirrlees, Manual of Indus-
    trial Project Analysis in Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1968); Dagobert L. Brito
    and Juan Rosellon, Pricing Natural Gas in Mexico: An Application of the Little Mirr-
    lees Rule— The Case of Quasi- Rents (Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research
    [DIW], 2010).

  3. Sufficient domestic refining capacity in the Gulf has always been a temporary phe-
    nomenon. Domestic refineries are periodica lly built to cope with rising fuel demand.
    Surpluses are exported until demand surpasses production and a new refinery is
    needed.

  4. “Foundations: The Keystone,” Aramco World, December 1982, http: //www .saudia
    r a m c o w o r l d. c o m / i s s u e / 1 9 8 2 0 6 / f o u n d a t i o n s - t h e. k e y s t o n e. h t m.

  5. EDGAR ([EU] Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research), “Fossil CO 2
    & GHG Emissions of All World Countries, 2017,” http: //edgar .jrc .ec .europa .eu /over
    v i e w. p h p? v=CO2andGHG1970- 2016.

  6. David Scott, Executive Director, Economic and Energy Affairs, Abu Dhabi Execu-
    tive Affairs Authority, telephone interview by Jim Krane, 2010.

  7. There is debate about whether electricity provision was an explicit quid pro quo for
    citizen political support or whether its subsidization owes itself to an unintentional
    failure to index tariffs to inflation.

  8. Rents can be defined as profits left over after deducting the cost of exploration, pro-
    duction, transport, refining, and marketing and after a reasonable rate of return.

  9. David Victor, “The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies,” Global Subsidies Initiative work-
    ing paper, October 2009, 20.

  10. Lisa Anderson, “Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture
    Approach,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex
    Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1:77– 92.

  11. Early rentier literature includes Hossein Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of
    Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in Studies in the Eco-
    nomic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press,
    1970), 428– 67; Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical
    Framework,” in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New
    York: Croom Helm, 1987), 63– 82; Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab
    World,” in The Rentier State, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York:
    Croom Helm, 1987), 85– 98.

  12. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6– 11.

  13. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab
    Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 80; Davidson, The United
    Arab Emirates.

  14. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 6– 11; Davidson, The United Arab Emirates, 70– 96.

  15. Victor, “The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies.”

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