The EconomistSeptember 14th 2019 The Americas 492
Bello Settling for half an arepa
G
iven thattheir home country was
built on oil, it is appropriate that the
social hub of Venezuelan exiles in Miami
should be a diner at a petrol station. El
Arepazo is in Doral, a suburb near Mi-
ami’s international airport with a golf
resort belonging to President Donald
Trump. It is a shrine to a Venezuela lost.
It is wallpapered with blown-up black-
and-white photos of Caracas in the 1950s
and 1960s. Along with strong coffee it
sells arepas, the cornmeal griddle-cakes
that are a Venezuelan staple.
Morale among the clientele is sag-
ging. “Trump is deserting us,” says Pedro
Pereira, who abandoned his dairy farm
near Lake Maracaibo in 2017 because of
threats, extortion and chronic shortages
of electricity and animal medicines. He
was full of hope in January this year
when Juan Guaidó, the head of the na-
tional assembly, proclaimed himself
interim president and was recognised by
55 countries who shared his view that
Nicolás Maduro’s second term as Vene-
zuela’s ruler is illegitimate. “But every-
thing was just words,” fumes Mr Pereira.
Like many exiles, he favours an Ameri-
can invasion, citing the one that dis-
lodged Manuel Noriega, a Panamanian
strongman, in 1989 at the cost of about
300 civilian dead.
But Venezuela is far bigger than Pana-
ma, its regime is better armed and it has
Cuba and Russia as allies. Despite much
bluster from American officials earlier
this year (“all options are on the table”),
there is no sign that Mr Trump, a war-
averse president, has any intention of
invading. Instead, to restore democracy
in Venezuela his administration trusts in
sanctions, ramped up to target Mr Madu-
ro’s oil exports and finances as well as 118
regime officials. The confident expecta-
tion in the National Security Council(nsc) in Washington was that they would
quickly cause the army to turn on its boss.
It hasn’t happened. And on September
10th the nsc’s hawkish chief, John Bolton,
was sacked. But the economic squeeze did
prompt Mr Maduro, who rules as a repres-
sive dictator, to start seemingly serious
talks with the opposition under the aus-
pices of Norway’s government. In late July,
according to several sources, the govern-
ment delegates agreed to an early presi-
dential election next year. On August 5th
the United States slapped on additional
sanctions without consulting the opposi-
tion. The Venezuelan government said it
was “suspending” the talks.
This does not mean they are dead,
though some in the Trump administration
have never believed in them. Elliott
Abrams, the State Department’s special
representative for Venezuela, says: “We’re
not trying to torpedo the talks. We think
our policies have made the talks possible.”
His position in the administration has
been strengthened by the failure of the nsc
to oust Mr Maduro, and by Mr Bolton’s
firing. But several obstacles remain.Top of the list is the position of Mr
Maduro in a transition. “There’s no way
to hold a free election with him in pow-
er,” says Mr Abrams, adding that Mr
Maduro could be a candidate. Hardliners
on both sides might reject whatever
negotiators agree to. Then there are Mr
Maduro’s allies. Russia has reportedly
sent security specialists to Venezuela.
The Trump administration has given
Cuba no incentive to help dislodge Mr
Maduro, having stepped up sanctions
against the communist island in what
looks like a bid to secure the Cuban-
American vote in Florida.
Critics of American policy point out
that sanctions have never toppled deter-
mined dictators. Although the humani-
tarian crisis in Venezuela is of Mr Madu-
ro’s making, the longer sanctions last the
more they will add to it. But what is the
alternative? Even if a military coup were
possible, “we know that a negotiated
solution is more likely to produce a
stable democracy,” says Mr Abrams. He is
frustrated that the European Union has
not widened sanctions on individuals in
order to make agreement easier.
Mr Maduro’s people are likely to agree
to a transition only if they have credible
guarantees that they will not be jailed or
expelled from politics. Rather than an
amnesty, that means a national-unity
government in which they have suffi-
cient power to protect themselves, ar-
gues an experienced former American
diplomat. “All negotiated transitions
have involved guarantees for the losers.”
Without such an agreement, El Are-
pazo’s customers may be in for a long
wait. Beside the café, groups of men sit at
tables under an awning playing domi-
noes. The scene could be that on Miami’s
Calle Ocho, where the Cuban exiles’
domino games have lasted 60 years.An agreement that allows chavismo to survive is the only option in Venezuelaking duck come from Canada. Their skin is
thicker than that of Chinese ducks, and so
does not become as crispy, explains Li Sha,
who helps run the restaurant. The sweet-
and-sour fish is Cuban pargo (red snapper),
not mandarin fish. Though tasty, it is a
clumpier meat that resembles fried cauli-
flower. Egg and tomato stir fry is off the
menu because the chefs cannot buy
enough eggs and tomatoes. Although beg
owns Yanjing, a Chinese brand of beer, do
not assume you can order it to wash down
your spicy cumin lamb. Crates of it await
clearance through the ports.Despite gastronomic glitches, beg
plans investments in Cuban hotels, condo-
miniums and a golf course. The Trump ad-
ministration’s hostility towards Cuba and
economic chaos in Venezuela, Cuba’s main
foreign backer, are strengthening its rela-
tionship with China. The country is Cuba’s
largest creditor. A fleet of Chinese-made
trains—the first Cuba has bought in 45
years—arrived in May. A $150m loan from
China helped pay for them. Most of the ve-
hicles joining elderly classic American cars
on Cuba’s roads are made by Geely, Yutong
and other Chinese brands. The machinerythat is gradually replacing cow-drawn
ploughs, still the usual method of tilling
Cuban fields, is made in China. Huawei
routers provide the outdoor hotspots that
make it possible for Cubans to go online.
So far, China has profited little from its
friendliness. From 2000 to 2018 it forgave
$6bn of Cuban debt, about 60% of the total
foreign debt that it wrote off during that
period, according to Development Reima-
gined, a consultancy, and the student-run
Oxford China Africa Consultancy. The two
communist states may be in for a period of
double disappointment. 7