The EconomistSeptember 14th 2019 Business 65
2 Even if the Chinese state gave its bless-
ing, who might be the buyer? Mr Ren says
he has “no idea”. Analysts suspect that
giants such as Ericsson and Nokia would
balk at an offer out of pride, and would
question the value of Huawei’s tech. (Hav-
ing posted losses last year, they are also
short of cash.) The technology may not
help a smaller firm compete on an equal
footing with Huawei. The Chinese com-
pany is so well entrenched with big opera-
tors, say consultants, that it would not
make financial sense for most of them to
take on a new supplier. Samsung, a South
Korean electronics giant, has deep pockets
and a smallish but growing networking-
gear business—and without rival bidders,
it could drive a hard bargain. A consortium
of buyers is possible; who would make one
up is unclear, however.
Suitors may be put off by other consid-
erations. If Huawei really is ready to trans-
fer all its technology to another company,
then, as Mr Wang points out, “it has to ac-
cept the risk of a major competitor in the
future”. But Huawei’s dominance owes as
much to technology as to its low prices and
the speed at which it can roll products out,
says Ms Sacks. Its willingness to serve
places Western firms steer clear of is also a
factor: who else besides Huawei would
wade through malarial swamps in Africa
and haul base stations up the flanks of Co-
lombian mountains? Mr Ren knows this.
Asked whether he thought that an Ameri-
can firm, with Huawei’s precious know-
how in hand, would be able to pull it off, he
said, with swagger, “I don’t think so.” But
potential buyers know it, too.
Lastly, few believe that a sale would pla-
cate America’s national-security appara-
tus, at least in the short run. A new compet-
itor would almost certainly still need to
make equipment in China, which produces
half of America’s telecoms kit. Concerns
about Chinese meddling would not go
away. And Huawei’s latest offensive is not
all charm. Last week it accused American
officials of committing infractions while
posing as Huawei workers, in order to
“bring unsubstantiated accusations
against the company”. It also accused
America’s government of targeting it with
cyber-attacks. That may sour relations.
Could Mr Ren’s proposal, then, be a sign
of desperation? Not a bit of it, he says. He
claims that Huawei has found alternative
suppliers for its network-infrastructure
business that are unaffected by its black-
listing by America. He denies that the com-
pany will make a loss in the coming year.
Nonetheless, the consumer business is
under pressure. Half of the company’s
$105bn in sales last year came from the
208m smartphones it sold around the
world. So did an outsize share of profits.
This business is in deep trouble. Phones
that Huawei sells outside China are desir-
able communication devices largely
thanks to proprietary software available ex-
clusively from Google. Android, Google’s
mobile operating system, which Huawei
uses, is open-source and freely available.
But the American tech giant’s own apps are
not. Because Google is American and its
apps are compiled in America, the Com-
merce Department’s ban on sales of Ameri-
can technology to Huawei applies to them.
Mr Ren says that Google has been lobby-
ing the Trump administration to allow it to
resume supplying Huawei with propri-
etary Android software, but so far to no
avail. Unless American policy changes,
Huawei will remain stuck with the open-
source version of Android, without any of
the apps that consumers have come to ex-
pect. The Chinese firm is in the process of
developing its own operating system, Har-
mony os, but it will be no rival to the ma-
ture Android ecosystem for years to come.
Sandboxed
This means that all new Huawei phones
will ship without Gmail, Google Maps, You-
Tube or, crucially, Google Play Store. The
Play Store is what allows Android users to
download apps like WhatsApp, Instagram
and Facebook easily. WhatsApp in particu-
lar has become a standard mode of com-
munication in much of the world outside
America. Unless its government lets up,
Huawei’s new smartphones will be little
more than decent cameras that make
phone calls. The firm will launch the Mate
30, the first top-end phone since its black-
listing, on September 19th in Munich. Hua-
wei claims its hardware features will buoy
sales. But a phone which lacks basic func-
tions is unlikely to be a hit. A weakened
consumer business would dent profits.
Huawei’s share of the Chinese smart-
phone market, where it has never relied on
Google’s apps, is growing fast. But two-
fifths of its annual phone sales, or roughly
$20bn, come from outside the country.
Though the firm’s executives repeatedly
declined to share any projections, firm-
wide revenue growth in the eight months
to August slowed to 20%, year on year, from
23% in the first half of 2019. If the Mate 30
and its successors flop, Huawei stands to
lose billions of dollars in annual revenue.
Similar supply-chain challenges affect
other parts of its business. Its coders are
busily writing software tools known as
compilers and libraries, themselves used
to create the software that powers all man-
ner of electronic devices, not just smart-
phones but also networking gear. As with
Android, Huawei would have to create its
own version of these, and a technological
ecosystem around them. Such ecosystems
take years to evolve, and there is only so
much one company can do to stimulate
this evolution, which relies on third-party
developers, with their own goals and in-
centives. Huawei’s expertise in high, hard
technology is of little use here.
And, Mr Ren’s assurances notwith-
standing, Huawei’s finances are being
squeezed. Even he concedes that its rela-
tions with large Western banks such as
hsbc and Standard Chartered have been
disrupted. Still, the firm has plenty of cash
and he says that smaller banks remain will-
ing to lend to it. The Chinese Development
Bank, which has reportedly extended cred-
it lines to Huawei and zte, a Chinese com-
petitor, in the past, may stump up if need-
ed. Mr Ren and his underlings repeatedly
claim that cashflow is “healthy”, pointing
to the firm’s furious building work. It has
just finished a 120-hectare, $1.4bn research
campus.
Huawei is being forced to transform it-
self from a company that makes and sells
hardware into one that also makes many
components that it used to buy from oth-
ers. This kind of shift strains a firm. Its cash
cow is under threat even as it has to invest
heavily to replace the suppliers and soft-
ware it can no longer get from America. Mr
Ren may hope that his mooted sale of Hua-
wei’s 5gtechnology will give him sufficient
fuel for the company to fly ever higher. But
peer behind the showy frescoes in Shen-
zhen, and his showier gesture, and Hua-
wei’s future looks decidedly hazy. 7
Embodied wisdom
Source: IPlytics
Biggest 5G patent-owners
Number of patents, December 2018
1
0 300 600 900 1,200
Samsung
Huawei
ZTE
Ericsson
Qualcomm
LG Electronics
Intel
Sharp
Realm of possibilities
Source: Company reports
Huawei, revenues
2018, yuan bn
By business
By geography
*Europe, Middle East and Africa
2
Telecom networks
294.0
Global services 74. 4
Devices
348.9
Other 3.9
China
372.2
EMEA*
204.5
Asia-Pacific 81.9
Americas 47.9
Other 14.7