66 Business The EconomistSeptember 14th 2019
1
A
pple’s productlaunches are not
what they used to be. A decade ago
the unveiling of a new iPhone would
inspire quasi-religious ecstasy; devotees
would camp on pavements outside shops
as the release date drew near. At the
firm’s latest event, on September 10th,
the format was the same: Apple’s boss
stood on stage, clad in a regulation black
jumper, and spoke of the world-changing
power of the company’s latest wares. But
the fizz was gone. The iPhone 11 looks like
a merely incremental improvement on
the models that have gone before it.
Smartphones have become boring.
Consumers around the world are up-
grading less frequently. Sales have stag-
nated (see chart). That poses a problem
for Apple, which has built its success on
charging eye-watering prices for aspira-
tional, frequently replaced devices. Its
response—to focus more on selling
services and less on selling hardware—
has been widely trailed. Those services
comprise everything from extended
warranties to the creation of an Apple-
exclusive store for video games, and for
streaming video, on which it plans to
spend $6bn and which is designed to
undercut rivals like Disney and Netflix.
The iPhone 11’s launch shows what
that strategy means for the hardware
side. Apple has been raising its prices for
years, but that trend has slowed. The
cheapest model of the iPhone 11 is the
lowest-priced phone the company has
launched in two years. That makes sense:
a service-focused company needs a
broad user-base. But it is a delicate bal-
ancing act. If prices fall too low, the firm
will lose its aspirational glow (the top-of-
the-range iPhone 11 Pro Max will cost you
$1,449). At the same time, Apple benefits
from a captive audience. Users of Goo-
gle’s rival Android phones have many
hardware-sellers to choose from, leading
to fierce price competition. Those who
prefer Apple’s ecosystem must buy
iPhones. That should keep margins
plump for the time being.
Are you being served?
Smartphones
Apple is relying less on pricey devices and more on services
Apple’s cart
Sources: Company reports; news reports; Canalys; IDC *Nominal †Excluding sales tax ‡To Q2
United States, Apple iPhone price* at launch, $ Revenue† per smartphone, worldwide, $
0 500 1,000 1,500
Storage capacity: Smallest Mid Biggest
iPhone (2007)
3G (2008)
3GS (2009)
4 (2010)
4S (2011)
5 (2012)
5C (2013)
5S (2013)
6 (2014)
6 Plus (2014)
6S (2015)
6S Plus (2015)
SE (2016)
7 (2016)
7 Plus (2016)
8 (2017)
8 Plus (2017)
X (2017)
XS (2018)
XS Max (2018)
XR (2018)
11 (2019)
11 Pro (2019)
11 Pro Max (2019)
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
2007 09 11 13 15 17 19‡
Apple
Huawei
Samsung
Smartphone shipments, worldwide, bn
0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
2007 09 11 13 15 17 19‡
Samsung
Apple
Huawei
Others
F
rom theair, the mine in Nakyn looks as
if a giant took an ice-cream scoop to the
Earth’s crust. Inside the pits, in Russia’s far-
eastern region of Yakutia, trucks with
wheels taller than their drivers rumble
along narrow dirt roads carved into the
mine’s walls, carrying loads of ore. The pur-
pose of this gargantuan enterprise is some-
thing altogether more discreet. For Nakyn
harbours one of the world’s richest depos-
its of diamonds.
As incongruous, at least on the face of it,
is the selling point Yakutian diamonds
have for the carat-crazy. “Provenance is our
competitive advantage,” says Sergei Iva-
nov, chief executive of Alrosa, the company
which owns the mine. Never mind that Al-
rosa’s own roots look questionable in some
eyes. The diamond-miner is controlled by
the Russian state, viewed with suspicion in
many countries for its annexation of Cri-
mea, its backing of Bashar al-Assad’s mur-
derous regime in Syria and election-med-
dling in America. Mr Ivanov’s father was
once chief of staff to Russia’s president,
Vladimir Putin. But the company’s gems
are not directly bloodied by strife, as some
of Africa’s conflict diamonds are. For many
bling-seekers, that is enough.
Mr Ivanov’s emphasis on provenance is
a response to changing consumer prefer-
ences, especially among younger buyers.
This year the Gemological Institute of
America has supplemented its “4c” grad-
ing scheme—colour, clarity, cut and car-
ats—with a fifth: country of origin. De
Beers, a diamond-industry stalwart
(owned by Anglo American, a British min-
ing giant), has a system for tracking dia-
monds from its mines to the jeweller’s dis-
play cabinet. Tiffany’s, an illustrious
American jeweller, has rolled one out, too.
In order not to fall behind, this summer Al-
rosa launched “electronic passports” for
each gem, which tell buyers which crafts-
men cut and polished it, as well as when
and, crucially, where it was extracted.
That is not the only big recent change to
Alrosa’s business. The company is also try-
ing to sell more of its own stones. It digs up
around 10m carats a quarter, which trans-
lates to two tonnes, or about one bathtub-
full. That is more than anyone else—and a
quarter of global production (see chart on
next page). But for most of its history it re-
lied on intermediaries to get its gems to the
market. In 1957, after the discovery of dia-
mond-rich kimberlite fields in Yakutia,
NAKYN
Natural diamonds are forever—or so
Russia’s state-owned gem-miner hopes
Russian diamonds
Romancing the
stones