The Economist UK - 07.09.2019

(Tuis.) #1

22 BriefingThe Syrian civil war The EconomistSeptember 7th 2019


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al-Sham (hts), al-Qaeda’s former Syrian
wing, were supposed to be completely ex-
cluded from this buffer zone. Less fanatical
groups could stay—albeit without heavy
weapons. Russia, in turn, would restrain
Mr Assad.
But the obdurate Syrian president never
accepted the idea of a rebel-held scar on the
edges of his realm. And Turkey overesti-
mated its ability to control groups like hts.
Both the rebels and the regime violated the
terms of the truce, lobbing ordnance and
explosive drones at each other. Even if they
had not, no one knew how to turn a tempo-
rary ceasefire into a lasting peace between
sworn enemies. The deal was never more
than a can-kicking exercise.
This summer the can ran out of road,
and both Russia and Iran threw their sup-
port behind Mr Assad’s offensive. The 12 ob-
servation posts dotted around Idlib from
which Turkish soldiers were meant to en-
force the ceasefire are now an irrelevance;
the one in Morek, south of Khan Sheik-
houn, is surrounded by the Syrian army.
The soldiers inside are safe, for now, but
other Turkish outposts have been hit by air
strikes. A Turkish military convoy has been
bombed as well.

Meltdown
Hoping to salvage the Sochi agreement, Re-
cep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Tur-
key, flew to Russia on August 27th. He
wanted Vladimir Putin to restrain his Syri-
an allies. The Russian president sent him
away empty-handed (though he did treat
Mr Erdogan to an ice-cream cone for the
benefit of the press corps). Unless Turkey is
willing to occupy Idlib, as it did parts of
Aleppo in 2016, it cannot forestall a regime
offensive. Russia talks of creating a new
buffer zone along the border, as if the 3m
desperate people in Idlib could be
crammed into a few kilometres.
More than 400,000 of those people

have already fled their homes. Civilians
find shelter where they can. Some camp in
olive groves, one family beneath each tree.
Civilians and surviving fighters will flee
abroad as the regime advances. For many
this will be a second exile. In staunch pro-
opposition areas like the Damascus sub-
urbs, the regime struck deals with rebels: it
allowed them to live but banished them to
Idlib. Now it will push them farther.
More than half the pre-war population
of 21m is now either internally displaced or
abroad. To some extent this is a simple
side-effect of war. But it is also a result of
government policy, like the truces which
displaced rebels to Idlib. Many have no
homes to return to. The regime has used
new laws to seize the property of some of
the displaced, who tend to be Sunnis. In
places like Marota City, on the western out-
skirts of Damascus, well-connected devel-
opers plan gleaming new homes that will
one day house loyalists.
Elsewhere there are few signs of recon-
struction. The government cannot afford
it. Gross domestic product is, at best, one-
third of its pre-war level, according to un
estimates; Venezuela looks almost prospe-
rous in comparison. The Syrian pound,
which for years was consistently worth two
American cents, is now worth less than a
tenth of that. The industrial base that
churned out textiles and consumer goods
is devastated; today’s main exports are
seeds, apples and nuts. Basic services are
scarce. Last winter brought rolling black-
outs and long queues at petrol stations.
As the fighting draws to a close, Western
powers have begun to debate whether to in-
vest in rebuilding. America is unlikely to
help. President Donald Trump is averse to
spending money on foreigners; both par-
ties in Congress find the thought of work-
ing with Mr Assad odious. The eusays it
will give no help until it sees political re-
form, but not all its member states agree

with this line. Some of their diplomats
couch their arguments for moving quicker
in humanitarian terms: “Do you give some-
one a bottle of water or rebuild the pipes?”
Others insist, implausibly, that aid might
persuade Mr Assad to share power and ease
repression. “There’s a real opportunity to
have some kind of leverage over how this
pans out,” says one foreign-policy official
in Brussels. This is wishful thinking.
A few offer an honest if self-interested
argument: rebuilding Syria might encour-
age refugees to go home. The devastation of
their country currently makes return very
uninviting, particularly for refugees in Eu-
rope, who live in relative comfort com-
pared with their compatriots in squalid
camps in Lebanon or Jordan. But material
wants are not their chief concern. In Febru-
ary the unsurveyed residents of one camp,
Rukban, a desperate patch of desert on the
eastern edge of the border between Syria
and Jordan. More than 80% wanted to go
back to their home towns, wrecked as they
might be.
Yet they feared to do so. They told the un
they would be homeless, because the re-
gime confiscated their property, or that
they would be detained, or pressed into
military service—all fair concerns. One
group, the Syrian Network for Human
Rights, estimates that at least 2,000 return-
ees have been arrested in the past two
years. Another organisation found that
75% of returnees had been interrogated,
detained or conscripted.
Syria can look elsewhere for recon-
struction money. China would have no
qualms about dealing with a brutal dicta-
torship. It would want to turn a profit,
though, and little about Syria’s corrupt and
shattered economy looks profitable. Mr As-
sad’s closest allies, Russia and Iran, are
struggling under economic sanctions. Nei-
ther can pick up a sizeable share of the esti-
mated $250bn-$400bn tab to rebuild Syria.

IRAQ

Damascus

TURKEY

CYPRUS

JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean Sea

IDLIB

Aleppo

M5 motorway

Euph
rates

Tigris

Government

Jihadists

Turkish troops/rebels

Kurdish militants

Rebels

Rebels

150 km
Syrian
refugees
2019*, m
3.65

0.93

0.66

0.13

0.04

0.23

Internally
displaced
2019*, m
6.20

North Africa
(excluding Egypt)

EGYPT Source: UNHCR *August or latest available

Areas of control
September 2nd 2019
Source: IHS Conflict Monitor^ M5 motorway Government

Jihadists

Turkish troops/rebels

Rebels

TURKEY

Kurds

IDLIB

LATAKIA

ALEPPO

Aleppo

Idlib

Ariha
Haas

Khan Sheikhoun
Morek

Turkish
observation
post

Russian
air base
SYRIA

25 km
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