One of the things which we were told after the Great
War would be a security for us was that Germany
would be a democracy with parliamentary institu-
tions. All that has been swept away. You have dicta-
torship—most grim dictatorship. You have milita-
rism and appeals to every form of fighting spirit.^5
Churchill’s rhetoric echoes the language of Shake-
speare: a most grim dictatorship would commit murder
most foul, before Hitler and his murder machine was de-
stroyed by the avenging nations of the Grand Alliance in
the tragedy that was the Second World War.
The Nazi regime came into power committed to gain
strategic advantage by building up Germany’s air power.
Hitler’s wars of conquest would succeed or fail depending
upon whether or not Germany possessed air superiority
over the battlefield. The Nazi regime moved very quickly
to develop the German air force, in direct violation of the
Versailles Treaty. Hitler felt no respect for treaties that
stood in the way of his ambitions to dominate Europe
and establish Germany as a world power. The restrictions
of Versailles prevented Germany from having a com-
petitive air force. As a consequence, Germany initially
lagged behind Britain in air strength and manufacturing
capacity. The historian Adam Tooze writes: “In 1932 the
German aircraft industry employed 3,200 people and had
the capacity to produce no more than a hundred aircraft
per year.” All that would change rapidly, as the regime
lavished resources on the development of Germany’s air
power. At the outbreak of war, the German aircraft indus-
try employed more than 250,000 workers “and was capa-
ble of turning out every year more than 10,000 of the most
sophisticated combat aircraft in the world.”^6 The German
buildup in air strength represented a revolution in the Eu-
ropean balance of power that would pave the way for Nazi
conquests.
The Prophet of Truth
C
hurchill was outspoken in calling attention to
this danger and for the need to build up British
air power to stay ahead of Germany in the emerg-
ing arms race. He feared the political and strategic conse-
quences if the RAF fell behind Germany in combat pow-
er. He understood that to lose the prewar arms race might
prove tantamount to losing the war. He was under no
illusions that Britain could conduct a successful foreign
policy and remain secure in dealing with Hitler if British
leaders had only a weak military hand to play.
In The Gathering Storm, Churchill argued that the fail-
ure to stay ahead of Germany in the arms race contrib-
uted to the war’s outbreak. He contended: “by extreme
exertions we could have preserved the air strength on
which our independence of action was founded. If Great
Britain and France had each maintained quantitative par-
ity with Germany they would together have been double
as strong, and Hitler’s career of violence might have been
nipped in the bud without the loss of a single life.”^7 Over-
whelming air superiority in the possession of Britain and
France provided the basis for preventing war.
Even if Hitler’s manic will to wage war ruled out de-
terring him, Churchill’s strategic prescription of staying
overwhelmingly strong in the air would have better pre-
pared Britain and France for the fighting to come. The
German army would have faced a much tougher fight
against France in 1940 if it had fought in a more hostile air
environment. Would Germany have been able to knock
out France if the German air force had been outmatched?
The battles of the Second World War would show that air
superiority was a prerequisite for successful ground offen-
sives. Armies lacking air superiority were vulnerable to air
assault and generally forced on the defensive. Germany’s
odds of quickly defeating France, as occurred in 1940,
would have been greatly reduced if Britain and France
had dominated in the air.
In advocating rearmament, Churchill gave close at-
tention to the threats posed on the sea and in the air to
British security. He argued that Britain needed superi-
ority over great power challengers in these strategic do-
mains. He grasped that protection of the British home-
land from air assault provided the foundation for Britain’s
security and international standing in an increasingly hos-
tile world. He urged in Parliament: “We ought to have a
large vote of credit to double our Air Force; we ought to
have it now, and a larger vote of credit as soon as possible
to redouble the Air Force.”^8 Peace and security required
winning the arms race against Germany.
Churchill urged a buildup in naval and air strength so
that Britain would not confront rising international chal-
lengers from a position of weakness. Churchill would fa-
mously highlight this connection between armed strength
and appeasement later in life, during the Korean War.
“Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to
the circumstances,” he stated. “Appeasement from weak-
ness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from
strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the
surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.”^9 Falling
behind Germany in armaments put Britain in a dangerous
strategic position of having to give in to Hitler’s geopolit-
ical ambitions or to fight him from a position of military
weakness.
ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON
OneofthethingswhichweweretoldaftertheGreat
War would bea security forus was that Germany
would be a democracy with parliamentary institu-
tions.Allthathasbeensweptaway.Youhavedicta-
torship—most grim dictatorship. You have milita-
rismandappealstoeveryformoffightingspirit.^5
Churchill’srhetoric echoes the language of Shake-
speare:a mostgrimdictatorshipwouldcommitmurder
mostfoul,beforeHitlerandhismurdermachinewasde-
stroyedbytheavengingnationsoftheGrandAlliancein
thetragedythatwastheSecondWorldWar.
TheNaziregimecameintopowercommittedtogain
strategicadvantagebybuildingupGermany’sairpower.
Hitler’swarsofconquestwouldsucceedorfaildepending
uponwhetherornotGermanypossessedairsuperiority
overthebattlefield.TheNaziregimemovedveryquickly
todeveloptheGermanairforce,indirectviolationofthe
VersaillesTreaty.Hitlerfeltno respectfortreatiesthat
stoodin thewayof hisambitions todominate Europe
andestablishGermanyasa worldpower.Therestrictions
of Versailles prevented Germany from having a com-
petitive air force. As a consequence, Germany initially
laggedbehindBritaininairstrengthandmanufacturing
capacity.ThehistorianAdamToozewrites:“In 1932 the
Germanaircraftindustryemployed3,200peopleandhad
thecapacitytoproducenomorethana hundredaircraft
per year.”Allthat wouldchangerapidly, astheregime
lavishedresourcesonthedevelopmentofGermany’sair
power.Attheoutbreakofwar,theGermanaircraftindus-
tryemployedmorethan250,000workers“andwascapa-
bleofturningouteveryyearmorethan10,000ofthemost
sophisticatedcombataircraftintheworld.”^6 TheGerman
buildupinairstrengthrepresenteda revolutionintheEu-
ropeanbalanceofpowerthatwouldpavethewayforNazi
conquests.
TheProphetofTruth
C
hurchill was outspoken in calling attention to
thisdangerandfortheneedtobuildupBritish
airpowertostayaheadofGermanyintheemerg-
ingarmsrace.Hefearedthepoliticalandstrategicconse-
quencesif theRAFfellbehindGermanyincombatpow-
er.Heunderstoodthattolosetheprewararmsracemight
prove tantamount tolosing thewar.He was under no
illusionsthatBritaincouldconduct a successfulforeign
policyandremainsecureindealingwithHitlerif British
leadershadonlya weakmilitaryhandtoplay.
In The Gathering Storm, Churchill arguedthatthefail-
ure to stay ahead of Germany in the armsracecontrib-
utedtothewar’s outbreak.Hecontended:“byextreme
exertions we could have preserved the airstrength on
whichourindependenceofactionwasfounded.IfGreat
BritainandFrancehadeachmaintainedquantitativepar-
itywithGermanytheywouldtogetherhavebeendouble
asstrong,andHitler’scareerofviolencemighthavebeen
nippedinthebudwithoutthelossofa singlelife.”^7 Over-
whelmingairsuperiorityinthepossessionofBritainand
Franceprovidedthebasisforpreventingwar.
Evenif Hitler’smanicwilltowagewarruledoutde-
terringhim,Churchill’sstrategicprescriptionofstaying
overwhelminglystrongintheairwouldhavebetterpre-
paredBritainand Franceforthefighting tocome.The
German army would have faced amuch tougher fight
againstFrancein 1940 if it hadfoughtina morehostileair
environment.WouldGermanyhavebeenabletoknock
outFranceif theGermanairforcehadbeenoutmatched?
ThebattlesoftheSecondWorldWarwouldshowthatair
superioritywasa prerequisiteforsuccessfulgroundoffen-
sives.Armieslackingairsuperioritywerevulnerabletoair
assaultandgenerallyforcedonthedefensive.Germany’s
oddsof quicklydefeating France,as occurredin 1940,
would havebeen greatlyreducedif Britain andFrance
haddominatedintheair.
In advocatingrearmament,Churchillgavecloseat-
tentiontothethreatsposedontheseaandintheairto
Britishsecurity. He arguedthat Britainneeded superi-
orityovergreatpowerchallengersinthesestrategicdo-
mains.HegraspedthatprotectionoftheBritishhome-
landfromairassaultprovidedthefoundationforBritain’s
securityandinternationalstandinginanincreasinglyhos-
tileworld.HeurgedinParliament:“Weoughttohavea
largevoteofcredittodoubleourAirForce;weoughtto
haveit now,anda largervoteofcreditassoonaspossible
toredoubletheAirForce.”^8 Peaceandsecurityrequired
winningthearmsraceagainstGermany.
Churchill urged a buildup in naval and air strength so
that Britain would not confront rising international chal-
lengers from a position of weakness. Churchill would fa-
mously highlight this connection between armed strength
and appeasement later in life, during the Korean War.
“Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to
the circumstances,” he stated. “Appeasement from weak-
ness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from
strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the
surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.”^9 Falling
behind Germany in armaments put Britain in a dangerous
strategic position of having to give in to Hitler’s geopolit-
ical ambitions or to fight him from a position of military
weakness.
ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON
