Political OppositionB
ritain certainly possessed the industrial, financial,
demographic, and scientific resources to build a
powerful air force. Churchill was confident that
Britain could stay ahead of Germany in the arms compe-
tition. After all, he directed as Minister of Munitions the
manufacture of large numbers of aircraft during the Great
War. The Second World War would show again how Brit-
ain could renew its strength as an air power. Churchill
had no doubt, too, that the British public would “have
sustained the measures necessary for national safety.”^10(^) Mobilizing these resources, however, required polit-
ical will and leadership. The British governments in pow-
er during most of the 1930s wanted to avoid having to
follow the strategic prescriptions proffered by Churchill
of arming against Germany. The leaders of the National
Government were not blind to the air menace. Stanley
Baldwin famously stated that “the bomber will always
get through.” Neville Chamberlain sought to expand the
RAF as a deterrent against Hitler, first by building up a
bomber force and later by strengthening capabilities to
defend against air attack. Appeasement was viewed as an
alternative to an arms buildup. Britain’s leaders wanted to
avoid the unpalatable reality of having to wage an arms
race, which they believed would be an inevitable precur-
sor to war. The efforts made by the National Govern-
ment, to be sure, provided the bare minimum of strength
to hold on in 1940.^11 Still, as Churchill maintained at the
time and later, the government could have done more to
prepare Britain for war if a smashup with Hitler could not
be avoided.
If Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain could have done
more, the opposition Liberal and Labour parties acted in
an even more irresponsible way in condemning the gov-
ernment’s steps toward rearmament. Clement Attlee, the
leader of the Labour Party, denounced the government’s
aim of maintaining parity between Britain and Germa-
ny in air strength, of not letting the German air force get
ahead of the RAF. In the Commons, Attlee spoke for La-
bour: “We deny the need for increased air armaments. We
deny the proposition that an increased Royal Air Force
will make for the peace of the world and we reject alto-
gether the demand for parity.”^12 When Churchill called
for a large increase in the strength of the RAF, he was at-
tacked for holding outlandish views. A former colleague
in government, Sir Herbert Samuel, criticized him for
demanding large increases in defense spending “without
giving the smallest reasons why this colossal expenditure
should immediately be undertaken. That is rather the lan-
guage of a Malay running amok than a responsible British
statesman. It is rather the language of blind and causeless
panic.”^13 Churchill was not blind, and he had good cause
to call for the maximum effort in building up British air
strength for a coming trial with Nazi Germany.
Churchill also gets criticized for supporting his friend
the “Prof,” Frederick Lindemann, in government efforts
to research, develop, and acquire an air defense system
during the 1930s. The dispute between Lindemann and
Sir Henry Tizard has become legendary. Today, Chur-
chill’s actions represent what is called “red teaming”—a
leadership tool to challenge assumptions and efforts with-
in an organization. The use of red teaming often generates
controversy, as leaders of organizations typically do not
relish having their projects subject to thorough criticism
and questioning, especially from outsiders. The disputes
within organizations can sometimes become deeply per-
sonal because they affect questions of leadership and
professional reputation. This red-team method, however,
formed part of Churchill’s leadership style for exploring
and evaluating alternative courses of action. Churchill’s
aim was to spur innovation and hurry along the British air
defense effort. Churchill’s support of Lindemann, while
antagonizing some of the government’s scientific advi-
sors, did not delay the building of radars networked into
an air defense system to provide warning of an approach-
ing aerial assault of the British homeland.
While he was a political opponent of Churchill, Vis-
count Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) also believed
Britain could have earlier done more to build up Britain’s
air strength. A former minister for air power, Templewood
sought to defend the actions of the National Government
in his memoir Nine Troubled Years. Nonetheless, he con-
ceded that Britain’s leaders erred in failing to increase the
RAF. Templewood admitted: “The inescapable fact was
only too obvious, that we had started rearmament too
late.” In particular, he believed that a “single year would
have made a vast difference” if Britain had adopted “an
intensified expansion of the Air Force.” He judged Ram-
ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON
“The bomber will always get through.”
PoliticalOpposition
B
ritaincertainlypossessedtheindustrial,financial,
demographic, andscientific resources tobuilda
powerfulair force. Churchillwas confident that
BritaincouldstayaheadofGermanyinthearmscompe-
tition.Afterall,hedirectedasMinisterofMunitionsthe
manufactureoflargenumbersofaircraftduringtheGreat
War.TheSecondWorldWarwouldshowagainhowBrit-
aincouldrenewits strengthas anairpower.Churchill
hadno doubt, too,that theBritishpublic would “have
sustainedthemeasuresnecessaryfornationalsafety.”^10
Mobilizingtheseresources,however,requiredpolit-
icalwillandleadership.TheBritishgovernmentsinpow-
erduringmostofthe1930swantedtoavoidhavingto
followthestrategicprescriptionsprofferedbyChurchill
ofarmingagainstGermany.TheleadersoftheNational
Governmentwerenotblindto theairmenace.Stanley
Baldwin famously stated that “the bomber will always
getthrough.”NevilleChamberlainsoughttoexpandthe
RAFasa deterrentagainstHitler,firstbybuildingupa
bomberforceandlater bystrengtheningcapabilitiesto
defendagainstairattack.Appeasementwasviewedasan
alternativetoanarmsbuildup.Britain’sleaderswantedto
avoidtheunpalatablerealityofhavingtowageanarms
race,whichtheybelievedwouldbeaninevitableprecur-
sor to war.The efforts made by theNational Govern-
ment,tobesure,providedthebareminimumofstrength
toholdonin1940.^11 Still,asChurchillmaintainedatthe
timeandlater,thegovernmentcouldhavedonemoreto
prepareBritainforwarif a smashupwithHitlercouldnot
beavoided.
If Baldwin and Neville Chamberlaincouldhavedone
more, the opposition Liberal and Labourpartiesactedin
an even more irresponsible way in condemningthegov-
ernment’s steps toward rearmament. ClementAttlee,the
leader of the Labour Party, denouncedthegovernment’s
aim of maintaining parity between Britainand Germa-
ny in air strength, of not letting the Germanairforceget
ahead of the RAF. In the Commons, AttleespokeforLa-
bour: “We deny the need for increased airarmaments.We
deny the proposition that an increasedRoyalAirForce
will make for the peace of the world andwerejectalto-
gether the demand for parity.”^12 WhenChurchillcalled
for a large increase in the strength of theRAF,hewasat-tackedforholdingoutlandishviews.Aformercolleague
in government, Sir Herbert Samuel, criticized him for
demandinglargeincreasesindefensespending“without
givingthesmallestreasonswhythiscolossalexpenditure
shouldimmediatelybeundertaken.Thatisratherthelan-
guageofa Malayrunningamokthana responsibleBritish
statesman.Itisratherthelanguageofblindandcauseless
panic.”^13 Churchillwasnotblind,andhehadgoodcause
tocallforthemaximumeffortinbuildingupBritishair
strengthfora comingtrialwithNaziGermany.
Churchillalsogetscriticizedforsupportinghisfriend
the“Prof,”FrederickLindemann,ingovernmentefforts
toresearch,develop,andacquire anairdefensesystem
duringthe1930s.ThedisputebetweenLindemannand
SirHenryTizardhas becomelegendary. Today,Chur-
chill’sactionsrepresentwhatiscalled“redteaming”—a
leadershiptooltochallengeassumptionsandeffortswith-
inanorganization.Theuseofredteamingoftengenerates
controversy,asleadersoforganizationstypicallydonot
relishhavingtheirprojectssubjecttothoroughcriticism
andquestioning,especiallyfromoutsiders.Thedisputes
withinorganizationscansometimesbecomedeeplyper-
sonal because they affect questions of leadership and
professionalreputation.Thisred-teammethod,however,
formedpartofChurchill’sleadershipstyleforexploring
andevaluatingalternativecoursesofaction.Churchill’s
aimwastospurinnovationandhurryalongtheBritishair
defenseeffort.Churchill’ssupportofLindemann,while
antagonizing some of thegovernment’s scientific advi-
sors,didnotdelaythebuildingofradarsnetworkedinto
anairdefensesystemtoprovidewarningofanapproach-
ingaerialassaultoftheBritishhomeland.
While he was a political opponent of Churchill, Vis-
count Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) also believed
Britain could have earlier done more to build up Britain’s
air strength. A former minister for air power, Templewood
sought to defend the actions of the National Government
in his memoir Nine Troubled Years. Nonetheless, he con-
ceded that Britain’s leaders erred in failing to increase the
RAF. Templewood admitted: “The inescapable fact was
only too obvious, that we had started rearmament too
late.” In particular, he believed that a “single year would
have made a vast difference” if Britain had adopted “an
intensified expansion of the Air Force.” He judged Ram-ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON“The bomber will always get through.”