Finest Hour – July 2019

say MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin flawed leaders who

did not provide the requisite drive to meet Hitler’s chal-

lenge.^14 Coming from one of Churchill’s political enemies,

Templewood’s assessment that British leaders could and

should have done more to build up Britain’s air power is

damning.

Time Lost

W

hile Churchill lamented the slow pace of re-

armament, he also maintained that Britain

would have been better off fighting Germany

in 1938 when Hitler threatened to attack Czechoslova-

kia instead of delaying and going to war a year later. In

The Gathering Storm, Churchill argued: “I remain con-

vinced...that it would have been better in all circumstanc-

es...to fight Hitler in 1938 than it was when we finally had

to do so in September 1939.”^15 On the other side of this

argument are those who contend that Britain’s air defens-

es were weak in 1938. The rationale offered is that Mu-

nich bought time for Britain to prepare better to fight in

the air. Of course, Britain did get stronger in air power in

the year between Munich and the outbreak of war. This

counterargument, however, is misleading because it only

focuses on British weakness. A much better approach to

analyzing the strategic position is a net assessment, a com-

parative examination of both sides, the forces available to

Britain in relation to Germany. When that net assessment

is done, Germany’s situation looks weak.

In 1938 Germany had no air force capable of doing

major damage by bombing the British homeland. In the

initial stages of the fighting, the German air force would

need to stay concentrated on supporting the army, first

in conquering Czechoslovakia before turning on France.

The Luftwaffe would have its hands full supporting

ground operations in Central and Western Europe before

being able to bomb Britain. Britain’s homeland, then, was

in no imminent danger of a major air attack if it went to

war in 1938.

Furthermore, geography matters. Inflicting major

damage on the British homeland required that Ger-

many’s air force possess bases along the Channel in the

Netherlands, Belgium, and France. German aircraft did

not have the range to strike Britain with decisive effect

from bases in Germany. To acquire those forward bases,

the German army would first have to seize the Low Coun-

tries and knock France out of the war. A successful major

land offensive was a precondition for a war-winning air

assault on Britain. Only by first winning on land, conquer-

ing Western Europe, could Germany’s air force have the

capability to inflict serious damage on the British home-

land.

In addition, once at war, Britain could accelerate the

buildup of its armed forces. While the RAF certainly got

stronger between 1938 and 1939, so too did the German

Luftwaffe. British air rearmament would have increased

even more under wartime conditions if Britain had gone

to war in 1938. This examination of the balance of forces

supports Churchill’s contention that Britain should have

drawn a redline at the time of the Munich crisis and, if

Hitler stormed ahead and invaded Czechoslovakia, de-

clared war rather than concede the dismemberment of

the Czech state. Instead of improving Britain’s relative

strategic position with regard to Germany, the year’s de-

lay on balance favored Hitler’s ambitions. Hitler told his

generals in August 1939: “England is vulnerable to air at-

tack. The English air force itself has only about 130,

men, whereas we have 390,000.”^16 Churchill was proved^

correct that British weakness in the air would spur Hitler

to carry out his aggressive design for hegemony in Europe

on his drive to establish a Nazi superpower in the global

arena.

The Second World War

T

he prewar arms race had profound strategic impli-

cations for the fighting once the war began. Ger-

many’s ability to gain air superiority over much of

the Western Front during the spring of 1940 was a critical

enabler of the German defeat of France. German armored

columns could not have raced to the Channel if they

had been forced to operate in a hostile air environment.

Where the Germans faced resistance in the air, their oper-

ations faltered. At Dunkirk, for example, Britain’s ability

to contest the air space over the Channel enabled the mir-

acle of deliverance, the evacuation of British and French

ground forces, to occur. That more than 300,000 soldiers

escaped the German encirclement—instead of the initial

estimate that only 30,000 could be evacuated—hinged

on the aerial umbrella unfolded by the RAF.

Britain’s ability to stand up to the German air assault

through the rest of 1940 proved a turning point in the

war. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy took a gloomy view

of Britain’s chances of winning the coming Battle of Brit-

ain. He wrote his son, the future President John F. Ken-

nedy: “The whole crux of the matter is...the strength of

the German air force....If they have the strength they pre-

tend to have and they come over and knock off the Brit-

ish air force, it will not make the slightest difference what

land precautions the British have made. No country can

stand up unless it has air parity with another country.”^17

The Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky recorded in his dia-

ry that Kennedy “thinks it utterly inevitable that England

will be almost completely destroyed by air raids.”^18 The

ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON

say MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin flawedleaderswho
did not provide the requisite drive to meetHitler’schal-
lenge.^14 Coming from one of Churchill’spoliticalenemies,
Templewood’s assessment that Britishleaderscouldand
should have done more to build up Britain’sairpoweris
damning.

Time Lost

W

hile Churchill lamented theslowpaceofre-
armament, he also maintained that Britain
would have been better offfightingGermany
in 1938 when Hitler threatened to attackCzechoslova-
kia instead of delaying and going to wara yearlater.In
The Gathering Storm, Churchill argued: “Iremain con-
vinced...that it would have been betterinallcircumstanc-
es...to fight Hitler in 1938 than it was whenwefinallyhad
to do so in September 1939.”^15 On theothersideofthis
argument are those who contend that Britain’sairdefens-
es were weak in 1938. The rationale offeredisthatMu-
nich bought time for Britain to preparebettertofightin
the air. Of course, Britain did get strongerinairpowerin
the year between Munich and the outbreakofwar.This
counterargument, however, is misleadingbecauseit only
focuses on British weakness. A much betterapproachto
analyzing the strategic position is a net assessment,a com-
parative examination of both sides, theforcesavailableto
Britain in relation to Germany. When thatnetassessment
isdone,Germany’ssituationlooksweak.
In 1938 Germany had no air forcecapableofdoing
major damage by bombing the Britishhomeland.Inthe
initial stages of the fighting, the Germanairforcewould
need to stay concentrated on supportingthearmy,first
in conquering Czechoslovakia before turningonFrance.
The Luftwaffe would have its hands full supporting
ground operations in Central and WesternEuropebefore
being able to bomb Britain. Britain’s homeland,then,was
in no imminent danger of a major airattackif itwentto
warin1938.
Furthermore, geography matters. Inflicting major
damage on the British homeland required that Ger-
many’s air force possess bases along theChannelinthe
Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Germanaircraft did
not have the range to strike Britain withdecisiveeffect
from bases in Germany. To acquire thoseforwardbases,
the German army would first have to seizetheLowCoun-
tries and knock France out of the war.Asuccessfulmajor
land offensive was a precondition fora war-winningair
assault on Britain. Only by first winningonland,conquer-
ing Western Europe, could Germany’sairforcehavethe
capability to inflict serious damage ontheBritishhome-
land.

Inaddition,onceatwar,Britaincouldacceleratethe

buildupofitsarmedforces.WhiletheRAFcertainlygot

strongerbetween 1938 and1939,sotoodidtheGerman

Luftwaffe.Britishairrearmamentwouldhaveincreased

evenmoreunderwartimeconditionsif Britainhadgone

towarin1938.Thisexaminationofthebalanceofforces

supportsChurchill’scontentionthatBritainshouldhave

drawna redlineatthetimeoftheMunichcrisisand,if

Hitlerstormed ahead andinvadedCzechoslovakia, de-

clared war ratherthanconcede thedismembermentof

theCzech state.Instead of improvingBritain’s relative

strategicpositionwithregardtoGermany,theyear’sde-

layonbalancefavoredHitler’sambitions.Hitlertoldhis

generalsinAugust1939:“Englandisvulnerabletoairat-

tack.TheEnglishairforceitselfhasonlyabout130,

men,whereaswehave390,000.”^16 Churchillwasproved

correctthatBritishweaknessintheairwouldspurHitler

tocarryouthisaggressivedesignforhegemonyinEurope

onhisdrivetoestablisha Nazisuperpowerintheglobal

arena.

TheSecondWorldWar

T

heprewararmsracehadprofoundstrategicimpli-

cationsforthefightingoncethewarbegan.Ger-

many’sabilitytogainairsuperiorityovermuchof

theWesternFrontduringthespringof 1940 wasa critical

enableroftheGermandefeatofFrance.Germanarmored

columns could not have raced to the Channel if they

hadbeenforcedtooperateina hostileairenvironment.

WheretheGermansfacedresistanceintheair,theiroper-

ationsfaltered.AtDunkirk,forexample,Britain’sability

tocontesttheairspaceovertheChannelenabledthemir-

acleofdeliverance,theevacuationofBritishandFrench

groundforces,tooccur.Thatmorethan300,000soldiers

escapedtheGermanencirclement—insteadoftheinitial

estimatethat only30,000 couldbeevacuated—hinged

ontheaerialumbrellaunfoldedbytheRAF.

Britain’s ability to stand up to the German air assault

through the rest of 1940 proved a turning point in the

war. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy took a gloomy view

of Britain’s chances of winning the coming Battle of Brit-

ain. He wrote his son, the future President John F. Ken-

nedy: “The whole crux of the matter is...the strength of

the German air force....If they have the strength they pre-

tend to have and they come over and knock off the Brit-

ish air force, it will not make the slightest difference what

land precautions the British have made. No country can

stand up unless it has air parity with another country.”^17

The Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky recorded in his dia-

ry that Kennedy “thinks it utterly inevitable that England

will be almost completely destroyed by air raids.”^18 The

ARMING FOR ARMAGEDDON