Finest Hour – July 2019

Roughly two-thirds of all fighters sent to France were

lost, with many just abandoned in various states of repair.

Equally worrying were losses in groundcrew and support

equipment. Fortunately, with airbases far from the Pan-

zer assault, many were later repatriated from uncaptured

French ports, though the RAF lost some 800 men when

the troopship Lancastria was bombed and sunk on 17

June.

Fateful Decisions

F

ollowing the fall of France, Churchill warned om-

inously:

What General Weygand called the Battle of France

is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to

begin....Hitler knows that he will have to break us in

this Island or lose the war....Let us therefore brace

ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if

the British Empire and its Commonwealth^ last for a

thousand years, men will still say, “This was their fin-

est hour.”^4

Immediately, Churchill appointed the press baron

Lord Beaverbrook as  Minister of Aircraft Production.

Beaverbrook overhauled all aspects of war-time aircraft

production. He increased production targets by 15%

across the board, took control of aircraft repairs and RAF

storage units, and was perpetually at odds with all other

departments, especially in his prioritisation of aircraft

over tanks.^5

(^) Had there been no English Channel, the Wehrmacht
would no doubt have marched successfully on London.
Hitler’s ill-considered invasion of Norway, however, had
virtually destroyed his Kriegsmarine. Just three capital
ships remained available, and no assault on Britain could
be contemplated against a British Home Fleet of nine
battleships, three carriers, nineteen cruisers and up to a
hundred destroyers dominating the home seas, and with
the Royal Air Force still commanding British skies.
Hitler favoured an invasion only if there was no oth-
er way. German naval commander Admiral Raeder un-
derstandably favoured a joint air-naval blockade, seeing
invasion prospects as very uncertain. The best timing for
such an attack, in Raeder’s judgement, would not be until
May 1941. But Hitler was not convinced that such a delay
was acceptable. The weather could be as bad in May, the
BATTLE OF BRITAIN
Left
The Supermarine
Spitfire
Below
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Hugh Dowding,
Commander-in-Chief
RAF Fighter Command
1940
Roughly two-thirds of all fighters sent to France were
lost, with many just abandoned in various states of repair.
Equally worrying were losses in groundcrew and support
equipment. Fortunately, with airbases far from the Pan-
zer assault, many were later repatriated from uncaptured
French ports, though the RAF lost some 800 men when
the troopship Lancastria was bombed and sunk on 17
June.
Fateful Decisions

F

ollowing the fall of France, Churchill warned om-

inously:

What General Weygand called the Battle of France

is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to

begin....Hitler knows that he will have to break us in

this Island or lose the war....Let us therefore brace

ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if

theBritishEmpireanditsCommonwealth^ lastfora

thousandyears,menwillstillsay,“Thiswastheirfin-

esthour.”^4

Immediately, Churchill appointed the press baron

Lord Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production.

Beaverbrookoverhauledallaspects ofwar-time aircraft

production. He increased production targets by 15%

acrosstheboard,tookcontrolofaircraftrepairsandRAF

storageunits,andwasperpetuallyatoddswithallother

departments, especially in his prioritisation of aircraft

overtanks.^5

Had there been no English Channel, the Wehrmacht

would no doubt have marched successfully on London.

Hitler’s ill-considered invasion of Norway, however,had

virtually destroyed his Kriegsmarine. Just three capital

ships remained available, and no assault on Britain could

be contemplated against a British Home Fleet of nine

battleships, three carriers, nineteen cruisers and up to a

hundred destroyers dominating the home seas, and with

theRoyalAirForcestillcommandingBritishskies.

Hitler favoured an invasion only if there was no oth-

er way. German naval commander Admiral Raeder un-

derstandably favoured a joint air-naval blockade, seeing

invasion prospects as very uncertain. The best timing for

such an attack, in Raeder’s judgement, would not be until

May 1941. But Hitler was not convinced that such a delay

was acceptable. The weather could be as bad in May, the

BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Left

The Supermarine

Spitfire

Below

Air Chief Marshal

Sir Hugh Dowding,

Commander-in-Chief

RAF Fighter Command

1940