Barron\'s - 05.08.2019

(Michael S) #1

August 5, 2019 BARRON’S 29


Debtissuersaretakingstepstorestrictfunds’useofcreditdefaultswapsto


“manufacture”corporatedefaults. By Mary Childs


Hedge Funds’ CDS


‘Games’ May Be Ending


IN RECENT YEARS, SOME HEDGE FUNDS HAVE USED


credit default swaps to “manufacture” corporate


defaults,aimingforahandsomeprofitinthepro-


cess.Butthatmaybecomemoredifficultascorpo-


rations erect roadblocks to stop them.


Theswaps—financialproductsdesignedtohelp


mitigate credit risk—pay out to holders if issuers


missdebtpayments,fileforbankruptcy,orundergo


anyother“creditevent.”Butsomeissuers,arguing


thatthefunds’actionsareabusive,areworkingto


tightenlanguageindebtcontractstorestrictlend-


ers’ behavior.


Whilethehistoryofmanufacturedcreditevents


goesbackto2006,fundsrampedupthepracticein


recentyearsafterGSOCapitalPartners,a Black-


stone Group (ticker: BX) hedge fund, cajoled


Spanishgamingcompany Codere (CDR.Spain)into


skippinganinterestpaymentonaloanthatGSO


owned, triggering a CDS payout to GSO.


GSO tried to engineer a credit event by home


builder Hovnanian Enterprises (HOV), but stood


downafterahedgefundthathadsoldtheCDSsued.


Inanothersituation,hedgefundChathamAsset


Management encouraged publisher McClatchy


(MNI) to stop issuing debt by an entity to which


itsCDSweretied,“orphaning”thecontractsand


sending the value plummeting.


TheCommodityFuturesTradingCommission,


whichgovernspartoftheCDSmarket,observed


14 manufactured credit events in the past 2½


years,comparedwithjustsixinthedecadeended


in 2016, former chairman Christopher Giancarlo


said on a July 10 CFTC podcast.


Inadifferenttypeofsituation,AureliusCapital


Management claimed telecom-services provider


WindstreamHoldings (WIN)wasindefaultdue


toayears-oldcovenantbreach.InFebruary,after


a courtruledinAurelius’favor,Windstreamfiled


for bankruptcy protection.


The“silverlining”totheWindstreamdebacleis


that“borrowersarekeptontheirtoesbythepros-


pectofvigorouscovenantenforcementbycreditors,”


CovenantReviewanalystIanWalkerwroteinMay.


Andnow,theyarealsoontheirfeet,takingsteps


to prevent lenders from getting the best of them.


Companiesare“usingdebtdocumentsasaprophy-


lactic tool to avoid the consequences suffered by


Windstream,”analystsatFitchRatingswroteina


June report.


Issuershavetrieddifferentapproaches,includ-


ing disenfranchisement provisions in loan docu-


ments that disqualify any net-short lender—one


whosepositionmightmotivateittopushthebor-


rowerintodistress—fromvotingitsinterests.Such


lenders must disclose their status.


Issuersarealsotighteningtimelimitsoncredi-


torobjectionstoactions,somethingthatgenerally


wasn’tproscribedinthepast. ClearChannelOut-


door Holdings (CCO) and Builders FirstSource


(BLDR) have recently written language giving


debtholderstwoyearstoobject,inwhatXtractRe-


searchcalls“contractuallyshortenedstatutesoflim-


itations,”orSOLs.Somedocumentsnowmandate


alonger“defaultcureperiod”—moretimefortheis-


suer to fix a problem or ask lenders to waive a


breach.Another:uppingtheproportionoflenders


who can declare a default.


Whenfacility-servicescompanyAlliedUniver-


sal issued debt in June, it wrote in a disenfran-


chisementprovisionandanSOL. NexstarMedia


Group (NXST)and Grubhub (GRUB)issueddebt


recently with SOLs and extended cure periods.


SiriusComputer’sJunedebtissuewas“thefull


monty,” wrote Xtract’s Valerie Potenza. Terms


barrednet-shortlendersfromvotingasstakehold-


ersnormallydo,andgaveSiriuspowertotransfer


their holdings to a third party or to Sirius.


Hedgefundshaven’ttestedthenewdealterms,


andtheymaynotwork.Therearestructuralchal-


lenges: Issuers can’t disenfranchise bondholders


due to regulations, for example, so that new lan-


guage “fails to capture the very type of conduct


thatledtoWindstream’sbankruptcy,”Fitchwrote.


Preventing all future loophole exploitation is


nearly impossible, Potenza says.


“People always come up with some innovative


waytoworkaroundaprovisionthatseemsinsur-


mountable,” she tells Barron’s. “It could be any


structure, if somebody sees an opening.”


CovenantReviewsaysthatthefixesriskover-


shooting.“Iftheseattemptscontinuetoproliferate


andmutate,theymaythreatengood-faithcovenant


enforcementbycreditorsthatarenotplayingCDS


games,”analystRossHallockwroteinaJunenote.


Representatives for Aurelius, GSO, and Chat-


ham declined to comment.


Although low interest rates have made debt


agreements a playground for creativity, they’re


generallyprettyexplicit;mostbehavioriscodified.


But CDS are relatively new and were built to be


more malleable than other instruments.


What’smore,theyfallawkwardlybetweentwo


regulators:TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommis-


sion oversees single-name CDS; the CFTC, CDS


indexes.MostCDSuserstradeboth,oftenpaired.


The two agencies don’t always collaborate seam-


lessly, which has created confusion.


Regulatorsandmarketparticipantsworrythat


CDScreativityundermineswhattrustremainsina


productmanyblameforthefinancialcrisisanda$6


billionlossat JPMorganChase (JPM).Lettingthe


most aggressive investors push rules might scare


those who just want to hedge credit risk.


“Our focus on these strategies is sharpening,


andintensifying,”Giancarlosaidonthepodcast.


Low interest


rates have


made debt


agreements


a playground


for creativity,


but they’re


generally


pretty explicit;


most of


their behavior


is codified.


But CDS are


relatively


new and were


built to be


more malleable


than other


instruments. Tara Jacoby

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