152 Notes to Pages 11–12
Tyrtaeus (POxy. 3316 = F23a [West]) confirms the contention of Pausanias (2.24.7, 3.2.2–3, 7.3–6,
4.5.1–3, 10.1, 6–7, 11.1–8, 14.1, 8, 15.7, 17.2, 7, 8.27.1) that Argos was already hostile to Sparta in
the very early years of the archaic period. Note also Xen. Hell. 3.5.11, Strabo 8.4.10.
- Helots of two regions greatly outnumber the Spartans: Hdt. 9.10.1, 28.2, 29.1, 61.2. The
precise numbers are disputed: see the demographic studies cited in note 10, above. Note also Xen.
Hell. 3.3.4–5. Even after Messenia had become independent, the helots remained numerous.
Plutarch (Cleom. 18.3) claims that Aetolians invading the region in the third century were able to
run off with fifty thousand slaves; the observation made by one Spartan that these invaders had
helped the city by lightening her burden suggests that virtually all of those taken were helots. The
extent of that burden in earlier times helps explain the intensity of the Spartan eagerness to con-
serve manpower, especially after 465: Hdt. 7.205.2; Thuc. 4.15, 19.1, 5.15; Diod. 13.52.3; Androtion
FGrH 324 F44; Plut. Ages. 30. - Períoıkoı loyal only out of fear: Xen. Hell. 3.3.6. Note the manner in which they com-
ported themselves when the opportunity for rebellion presented itself: Thuc. 1.101.2; Xen. Hell.
6.5.25, 32, 7.2.2, Ages. 2.24; Plut. Ages. 32.12. See also Cartledge, SL, 153–66, and David, “Revolu-
tionary Agitation in Sparta after Leuctra,” 299–308. Cf. Graham Shipley, “Perioikos: The Discovery
of Classical Lakonia,” in Philolakōn, 211–26. Allies often disaffected and sometimes hostile: Chris-
tina Wolff, Sparta und die peloponnesische Staatenwelt in archaischer und klassischer Zeit (Munich:
Herbert Utz Verlag, 2010). Note also Rahe, PC, Chapters 4 and 5. I treat this question in detail in
The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Athenian Challenge, forthcoming.
23.Corinthian leader on Spartan weakness nearer home: Xen. Hell. 4.2.11–12. Demographic
decline: Appendix 1. Single defeat apt to endanger: consider Xen. Hell. 7.1.10, Arist. Pol. 1270a29–
34, in light of Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Considérations
sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence 18.52–60, in Œuvres complètes de
Montesquieu II (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000), 235. - Fear as a fundamental passion: Thucydides (cf. 8.40.2 with 24.4) hints at this. So does
Isocrates (12.177–81). See Lys. 33.7 with Preston H. Epps, “Fear in Spartan Character,” CPh 28
(1933): 12–29. For the salutary effect of such fear, see Pl. Leg. 3.699c, Arist. Pol. 1308a24–30. What
the helot threat did for the citizens of Sparta, the Etruscans, Samnites, Gauls, and Carthaginians
accomplished for the Roman aristocracy: cf. Sall. Iug. 41.3 with Jochen Martin, “Dynasteia,” in
Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte, ed. Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978),
228–41. Slow to go to war: Thuc. 1.23.6, 68–71, 88, 118.2, 5.107, 109. Caution on the field of battle:
Hdt. 9.46–48 and Thuc. 5.63–65. When successful in routing the foe, the Spartans were more
concerned with minimizing their own losses than with making their victory complete. Thus,
where the Athenians were inclined to charge forward, press home their advantage, and slaughter
or capture as many as possible of those who had taken to heel, the Spartans tended to hold back
and to remain in formation under the protection afforded by their phalanx: cf. Thuc. 1.70.2–5 with
5.73.4, and see Paus. 4.8.11; Plut. Lyc. 22.9–10, Mor. 228f. For similar reasons, the Lacedaemonians
were prohibited from dispersing to strip the bodies of the enemy dead: Plut. Mor. 228f–229a and
Ael. VH 6.6. Interests confused with honor: cf. the charge made at Thuc. 5.105.3–4 with the pattern
of behavior evidenced at 3.52–68. Distrust and deceit: Hdt. 9.54.1 with Alfred S. Bradford, “The
Duplicitous Spartan,” in SS, 59–85, and Andrew J. Bayliss, “Using Few Words Wisely? ‘Laconic
Swearing’ and Spartan Duplicity,” in SCA, 231–60. The Spartans were even supposed to have in-
vented the stratagem of securing victory by bribing key figures on the enemy side: Paus 4.17.2.
Note also Plut. Ages. 32.14, Marc. 22.9–10, Mor. 238f: it was considered more glorious to win by
trickery than in a pitched battle. Temple to Phóbos: Plut. Cleom. 9.1–2 with Ernst Bernert, RE s.v.
Phobos XX:1 (1941): 309–18, and Marie-Madeleine Mactoux, “Phobos à Sparte,” RHR 210:3
(1993): 259–304.
25.Imbued with a fear of the gods: Paus. 3.5.8. The evidence for Spartan piety is ubiquitous:
see Hdt. 1.65–70, 5.42–46, 62–75, 90–93, 6.52–86, 105–7, 120 (cf. Pl. Leg. 3.698c–e, Paus. 4.15.2,
Strabo 8.4.9), 7.133–37, 204–6, 220–21, 239, 8.141, 9.7–11, 19, 33–38, 61–62, 64–65, 73, 78–81,
85; Thuc. 1.103, 112, 118, 126–34, 2.74, 3.14–15, 92, 4.5, 118, 5.16–18, 23, 30, 49–50, 54, 75–76,
82, 116, 6.95, 7.18, 8.6; Xen. Hell. 3.1.17–19, 23–24, 2.21–31, 3.1–5, 4.3–4, 6, 11, 15, 18, 23, 5.5,
23–25, 4.2.20, 3.14, 21, 5.1–2, 11, 6.10, 7.2–5, 7, 5.1.29, 33, 3.14, 19, 27, 4.37, 41, 47, 49, 6.4.2–3
(cf. 7–8), 15–16, 5.12, 17–18, 7.1.31, 34, Lac. Pol. 8.5, 13.2–5, 8–9, 15.2–5, 9, Ages. 1.2, 10–13, 27,