Remarks on layering 293
many dimensions which are entirely non-visual (e.g. possession, trading
conventions, etc.), and epistemic modal evaluations are by definition en-
tirely non-perceptual. What all of this means for the nature and (no doubt
highly complex) organization of the human conceptual systems is beyond
the present chapter (but see Nuyts 2001b for discussion).
- The FG distinction between subjective and objective epistemic (and deon-
tic) modality is conceptually problematic, as I have argued in Nuyts (1992b,
2001a, 2001). So I will not draw this distinction in the remainder of this
chapter. Even if one does draw it, however, the arguments made in this
chapter remain intact, since each subtype will still attract at least two alter-
native expression forms.
- On the pervasiveness of this principle of ‘borrowing’ and its links to dia-
chronic processes such as subjectification and grammaticalization, see
Nuyts (1998, 2001a).
- An asterisk in these examples obviously refers to a semantic anomaly, not
(necessarily) to a grammatical one.
- It is more difficult, if not impossible, to give an example combining a per-
formative epistemic and deontic qualification. But that has little to do with
the hierarchical relation between them. This combination – quite like a
combination of performative epistemic and evidential forms or of performa-
tive deontic and evidential forms, for that matter – is hard to get for reasons
that have to do with the basic nature of these qualifications as ‘attitudinal’
or ‘committing’ categories (see below) and the limits this imposes on con-
ceptual processing. See Nuyts (2001a) for an explanation.
- As mentioned before, I do not adopt the distinction between subjective and
objective modality here. But for those who do accept this distinction in FG,
example (3) is based on the assumption that in current FG modal auxiliaries
would classify as objective (i.e. belonging at the predication layer). The ar-
gument actually works equally well with epistemic predicative adjectives,
which are no doubt considered objective.
- Obviously, there are quite a few qualificational categories missing from this
list, at least including (inter)subjectivity and mirativity, boulomaic or emo-
tional attitude, volition, and kinds of spatial situation and direction. The
reason for omitting them is that their precise position in the system or their
exact status relative to other categories is not clear to me at present. Notions
such as dynamic modality and manner of action probably fit under the label
of one of the types of aspect.
- The very fundamental nature of the layered system obviously also explains
why this system has such a pervasive effect on linguistic development. It is
well known that the ontogenesis of modal meanings (dynamic, deontic,
epistemic) largely follows one, cross-linguistically recurrent path, which
corresponds to climbing up the qualificational hierarchy in (4) (see, for in-
