294 Jan Nuyts
stance, Stephany 1993 and Hickmann et al. 1993). Similarly, the diachronic
evolution of qualificational expressions in general is known to follow the
cline in the layered system (cf., for example, Traugott’s many illustrations
of the principle which she dubs ‘subjectification – Traugott 1989, 1995,
1997, among others – and which clearly correlates with ‘gaining height’ in
the layered system in (4) – cf. Nuyts 2001a). For acquisition, the reason for
the correlation is obvious. Increasing reliance on information external to the
SoA proper and increasing abstractness and generalization obviously lead to
increasing complexity involved in determining the status of the SoA. And,
presumably, higher complexity correlates with greater acquisitional diffi-
culty, hence later acquisition. For diachronic evolution this explanation is
less evident: why should complexity in an individual mind correlate with
order of long-term development in a linguistic community? Yet in the bio-
logical world evolution also appears to lead to increasingly complex
organisms. So it is tempting to assume that even for diachrony there is
something to the matter of the complexity of the qualificational categories,
even if it is not immediately apparent in which way.- The SoA can be either real or non-real: cf. It is a good thing that you did
that vs. You should do that soon. However, this reality status as such is not
at issue, but is a ‘precondition’ for the deontic evaluation. - Probably the parallelism between the two levels goes very far, in the sense
that qualificational expressions at both levels are at least roughly subject to
the same organizational principles, microstructurally (i.e. their ordering be-
ing determined by semantic scope) and macro-structurally (in terms of the
general rationale behind the organization). But showing this is beyond the
present chapter. - Representational vs interpersonal will probably not do for that purpose
anyway: see Nuyts (1992a: 26–64, 1993b). - If anything, deontic modality would then appear to have more to do with an
interpersonal or social dimension than inference, although that is exactly the
opposite of what the FG account implies. But in a way, everything concep-
tual is social or interpersonal. This is clearly true of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but the
same applies, for example, to what one considers fast or slow, or large or
small (i.e. kinds of aspectual qualifications). Mind is a thoroughly social
phenomenon, but that observation helps little to structure the layered sys-
tem. - This is reflected in the fact that all attitudinal qualificational expressions
show a difference between performative and descriptive uses, i.e., respec-
tively, between uses in which the speaker expresses his/her own current
attitude towards the SoA and uses in which a speaker reports on someone
else’s, or his/her own but former, attitude without thereby committing
him/herself to the SoA at the time of speaking. Compare I think he is the