“YELLOW ARAB HELMET, BLUE RUSSIAN EYES”down in the command chain, Serkov registered similar concern that “from bitter
experience of the previous war, many—though unfortunately not most [Eg yptians]—
understood that not much has been done yet to improve capability.” Presciently, he
added that the weakness remained “especially in air defense.” This was now addressed
by reorganizing Eg ypt’s air defense forces as a separate command from the Air Force,
on the Soviet model and presumably at the advisers’ behest, but it would not much
improve their performance for a year to come.^24
What, then, had motivated the Soviets to approve and support the 8 September
action, with the attendant risk of escalation into a full-scale conflict that they knew
the Eg yptians were still likely to lose? Varied and even contradictory rationales were
suggested by Western and Israeli analysts. The most far-fetched among them was that
the bombardment had been intended (but failed) to launch the decisive Eg yptian
attempt to cross the canal in force, retake its east bank and open it to shipping—an
aspiration that at this point would have been dismissed by the advisers.^25
D. The specter of Soviet action to open the canal
In January 1968, a UN-brokered attempt to free the merchant ships trapped in the
Suez Canal was blocked by Eg yptian demurral at Israeli use of the waterway once
reopened, and by Israeli suspicion that Soviet naval vessels based at Port Said would
be the first to enter the canal. A unilateral probe by Eg yptian boats northward from
Ismailia ended in a major firefight on 30 January.^26 According to Capt. V.I. Popov,
Soviet marines were landed again, in response to an Israeli attempt to capture the
northern entrance to the canal.^27 In early July, ahead of Nasser’s visit to Moscow, a
“mysterious Soviet dredge” went through the Turkish straits—fueling speculation
that the Soviets were preparing to force the canal or at least to clear the waterway from
Port Said to Ras el-Ish, the stretch held by Eg ypt on both sides.^28 “The Russians,” it
was suggested, “could send [the dredge] into the canal with a destroyer escort, daring
the Israelis to shoot.”^29 Conversely, it was rumored that “the next Soviet step [would
be] a political initiative to open the canal.”^30 Word was spread from “diplomatic
sources” in Cairo “that the United Arab Republic [Eg ypt] would permit Israeli car-
goes [as distinct from Israeli ships] to pass through the Suez Canal if Israeli troops
evacuated a strip of desert just east of the canal”—which could be interpreted as a bid
to justify a forcible move into the canal if Israel, as expected, rejected the deal.^31
Both variants of the canal-opening scenario were backed with estimates that “no
country has felt the pinch of the Suez shutdown more than Russia, which must send
its ships around Africa ... in order to keep Hanoi supplied.”^32 Such theories persisted
despite observations that shipments to Vietnam were already being made mainly
from the Soviet Far East.^33 Indeed, NATO had concluded by the beginning of 1968
that the Soviets had overcome any difficulty caused by the canal closure in respect of
Vietnam, and air transport had proved sufficient for their needs even in Yemen—so