THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973that the USSR “was unlikely to risk an explosion” on this account. But an alternative
hypothesis was that “opening up the canal” would enable the Soviets to link up with
their putative “new Indian Ocean fleet.”^34
In 1969, authoritative US estimates still held that only the closed canal was pre-
venting the formation of a Soviet fleet that would dominate the Indian Ocean.^35 Iran
too reportedly had “fears about Soviet domination of the Persian Gulf ... should the
Suez Canal eventually be opened.”^36 US naval commanders continued for years to
claim that reactivating the canal would be more advantageous to the Soviets than to
the Americans, both in order to maintain new bases in Yemen and Somalia and in
order to facilitate pressure on oil supplies.^37 But by 1971, the US admirals conceded
that “on balance, the relative disadvantage of an open canal should be accepted in the
interest of promoting peace and regional stability. If, as a part of reopening the canal,
Soviet presence in the UAR were reduced, this relative disadvantage to the United
States would tend to be offset.”^38
Even that was an overstatement. Soviet and post-Soviet literature on and from the
period reflects no pressing interest in reopening the canal beyond supporting Eg ypt’s
obvious economic gain. Certainly none was reflected in the mission purposes that
were imparted to Soviet commanders and servicemen in Eg ypt. During the India–
Pakistan War of 1971, with the canal still closed, Soviet ships from the Pacific Fleet
moved in fast enough to effectively counter a US carrier task force, and it appears that
afterward Moscow relied on a friendly, Soviet-supplied Indian Navy rather than
attempting a permanent presence of its own.^39 When the canal did open in 1975, no
Indian Ocean fleet or even eskadra materialized, and it was recognized that the canal’s
closure had actually rewarded the USSR, especially in respect of its oil trade.^40 As will
be seen, the Soviets did move to block alternative routes for Middle East oil to the
West, such as Israel’s Red-Med pipeline, which in 1968 began a major upgrade. In
retrospect, Western sources even identified “among the ships which had been sta-
tioned permanently at Port Said ... minelayers intended to mine the Suez Canal if the
Israelis should attempt a crossing.”^41 In early 1973, Secretary of State William Rogers
was quite correct in telling King Hussein of Jordan that “opening of Suez Canal ...
would be [of ] some advantage to [the] Soviets but we feel that advantages to US
would be even greater.”^42
But in the summer of 1968, scare-mongering about a canal reopening to Moscow’s
benefit was the order of the day. The new helicopter carrier Moskva, the Soviet Navy’s
largest ship and the symbol of its revised operational doctrine, caused a stir by passing
through the Turkish Straits on 24 August. It was described to the Sixth Fleet’s press
corps in Italy as “narrow enough to pass through the canal” and as slated to remain in
the Indian Ocean, when it would be replaced in the Mediterranean by its even newer
sister ship, Leningrad. This turned out to be as imaginary as the “vertical-takeoff
fighter planes” that were supposedly stationed on these carriers.^43