“YELLOW ARAB HELMET, BLUE RUSSIAN EYES”In confidential briefings, US officials were less concerned. The day after the
September 8 duel on the canal, responding to concerns in the Senate about “increas-
ing activity of the Russian Fleet” in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, Rusk
assessed that its “importance ... is more on the political side than it is on the military
side. ... They just are not in a position to support fighting units out in that part of the
world.” But Rusk was somewhat overoptimistic when he suggested the same about
the Mediterranean: “with NATO air power along the entire northern coast of the
Mediterranean, and with the 6th Fleet, their fleet in the Mediterranean ... is almost
as exposed as our forces are in Berlin.”^44
The Moskva was only the largest of twenty-four Soviet ships that entered the
Mediterranean in August 1968 alone, raising the Soviet presence to a peak of at least
sixty-five units, by US count.^45 Preoccupation with the “large Soviet naval presence
in the Middle East” was seen as distracting attention from other concerns.^46 Briefing
the Sixth Fleet’s press corps after the 8 September incident, Chief of Naval Operations
Thomas Moorer called the Moskva “visible evidence of Russia’s announced intention
to become a modern major offensive sea power ... which we must assume is capable
of landing Russian naval infantrymen.” Off the record, the admiral evidently inspired
“speculation the Moskva’s deployment was timed to give Eg ypt moral support during
a period of new tension with Israel.”^47 But the Moskva ranged no closer to the canal
than the Aegean, where it concentrated on training exercises for anti-submarine war-
fare. Its practical connection with Eg ypt was only through the Tu-16Rs from Cairo-
West, which took part in these maneuvers.^48
The dredge did reach Eg ypt but never showed up in the canal. It was put to con-
tinuous work improving the Mediterranean harbors used by the Soviet fleet.^49 In
October, it was joined by a floating drydock, which was pulled through the straits to
Alexandria by two Soviet tugs.^50 Soviet Navy divers were tasked with guarding the
drydock, ships and other installations against Israeli frogmen. They also performed
underwater welding and inspection on submarines that made port calls every three
to four months for maintenance and refueling.^51 Shortly after, an incredible number
of 4,800 Soviet shipyard workers was reported by the Sunday Telegraph as manning
the facilities. More plausibly, Polish diplomats disclosed the dispatch of 200 workers
from the Gdansk shipyards, in an unusually large non-Soviet input.^52 By “the end of
1968,” Alexandria was able to accommodate what naval historian Shirokorad
describes as the first visit by a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine to a foreign port.^53
The K-181, of the Kit or November attack-sub class, was routinely armed with
nuclear-capable torpedoes designed for use against coastal targets, though there is no
direct evidence that it carried them on this port call.^54 The visit was intended to “raise
morale” among the Eg yptian Navy’s seamen, but it surfaced in the press only the
following March. “Well-placed informants” in Cairo then revealed that it had taken
place “unpublicized”—which conforms with the Te l e g r a p h’s claim that Alexandria
port, like Cairo-West airbase, was by now under full Soviet control and was closed to