THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973was exaggerated. At headquarters in Cairo, Malashenko explicitly discerned “failures
of the Eg yptian forces during the exchanges,” and instructed the senior artillery
adviser to prepare recommendations for correcting them.
Meanwhile, “as combat engagements were not continuous ... the Eg yptian forces
were able to hold a series of training exercises at various levels from battalion to divi-
sion, including one at division level that included a parachute drop, from 4 to
8 O c t o b e r.”^76 This was evidently the occasion for Lashchenko’s review on the 9th, and
the “next missions” he assigned were carried out two weeks later. But in Washington,
though Secretary of State Rusk told a Senate committee that the “artillery duel ... this
time apparently was started by the Arabs,” he remained cautiously optimistic about
diplomatic prospects. “We would be, I think, somewhat surprised if there were a
resumption of any large scale military action.”^77
G. 26 October, the “rocket incident” and Israel’s airborne raids
The surprise came within six weeks. In the interim, Rusk had come away from two
days of talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko with little prospect of agreement to
advance the Jarring mission. Under increasing pressure from Congress as well as the
newly nominated Republican candidate Nixon, Johnson publicly approved negotiat-
ing the Phantom fighter plane sale.^78 As the deal’s opponents in the US administra-
tion feared, this cemented identification of the United States as Israel’s sponsor,
enabling an escalation of Soviet propaganda. Although one of the main arguments of
the deal’s proponents was to deter Soviet and Eg yptian action, the reverse was
achieved: it encouraged preemption before the much-feared F-4s were delivered.
By 26 October, at least some of Chistyakov’s recommendations appear to have
been implemented. When “the Eg yptians unleashed a storm of fire and under its
cover landed desantniki (landing troops) on the Israeli east bank,” Serkov noted that
the results were “even more significant” than on 8 September. On this point—that
the Eg yptians initiated the duel—the Soviets’ memoirs differ from Soviet declara-
tions at the time and conform to the Israeli version. Malashenko writes explicitly that
the cannonade was planned in advance. UN observers agreed with Israel’s charge that
the Eg yptians shot first; to prove it, the IDF pointed out that Eg ypt’s triumphant
announcement of its artillery barrage came only a few minutes after it claimed that
Israel had opened fire.
This “provocation” consisted, according to Cairo, of two 216mm rockets that
destroyed houses in Port Tawfik.^79 Out of the fourteen rockets the Eg yptians accused
Israel of launching that day at civilian targets, they produced one unexploded speci-
men, which they claimed was shot down by their anti-aircraft guns—quite a feat
given the missile’s short trajectory. Or was it the same one that had been shown ear-
lier to Karpov? Cairo also claimed that its big guns—clearly following Karpov’s
instructions—destroyed ten “newly constructed” rocket-launch sites.^80 Malashenko