“YELLOW ARAB HELMET, BLUE RUSSIAN EYES”also confirms that the Eg yptians’ firepower in this incident was “concentrated on the
Israelis’ 216mm [rockets].” The IDF, as before, denied using any missiles at all, but in
Eg ypt the entire engagement was henceforth referred to as “the missile incident” and
would later be described as “one of their major achievements.”^81 When the one-eyed
Dayan came again to inspect the battlefield, he was jeered by Eg yptian soldiers across
the canal as “Musa the blind man.”^82
Israeli “observers” told military correspondents that “the numerous Soviet advisers
posted in all Eg yptian units took an active part in directing the artillery fire.” “Experts
in Paris” agreed that “the enemy that Israel must defend against is the Russian enemy.
In artillery too, there are many Soviet experts even at the lower echelons.”^83 But in the
Knesset, Allon—Dayan’s perennial rival—“surprisingly” rejected suggestions that
Soviets were behind the bombardment. Allon admitted an oxymoron: Moscow was
encouraging a moderate faction in Eg ypt to reach a political settlement—while also
abetting warlike elements with arms supplies.^84 This would become the standard
“dualistic-policy” gloss for those who insisted on presuming a cautious Soviet posture
even when it did not conform to actual Soviet moves.
In Cairo, as usual, no public credit was given to the Soviet advisers, and their
deprecation of the vaunted Eg yptian success was unlikely to evoke much gratitude.
Karpov pointed at “incorrect technique” against the Israeli rocket array, due to faulty
implementation of his plan. Although Ryabukhin’s figures showed that on
26 October the Eg yptians used up less ammo—only 320 tons—analysis at the Soviet
advisers’ headquarters still found “a great waste of 16,000 rounds.” Noting improve-
ment in Eg yptian performance, Malashenko’s headquarters still detected residual
flaws, such as the DRGs’ failure to bring back prisoners or documents. Yet Serkov
noted correctly that “the Israelis suffered even greater casualties” than on 8 September.
This was again largely due to their unpreparedness: most of the fifteen Israeli fatali-
ties were caused when the first Eg yptian volley hit soldiers playing soccer in the open,
a fact so embarrassing that it was suppressed by military censorship. So was the ene-
my’s apparently having observed that IDF troops holding the canal line had been
rotated just two days before the incident.^85 Even if this was a fortunate fluke for the
Eg yptians, Serkov was astonished that the Israelis did so little in the six weeks since
the previous cannonade had shown up the frailty of their positions. “They had obser-
vation posts along the canal with Star-of-David flags waving over them ... The reason
for [their] casualties was mainly the lack of secure shelters.”
The Israelis were also surprised when, evidently thanks to Karpov’s skill, a battalion
headquarters that was supposed to be out of Eg yptian artillery range did come under
fire.^86 Here luck was on the Israelis’ side and no casualties were caused, though legends
spread about female soldiers fleeing naked from the shower shed.^87 On the other
hand, two Israeli fatalities were caused by three simultaneous desantnik raids across
the canal. Perhaps in order to excuse what they saw as an Eg yptian success, the Israelis