THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973stressed correctly that the raids were “obviously initiated and planned by Soviet advis-
ers,” but also overstated the raiders’ numbers: on 8 September, each party’s strength
had been put at thirty to fifty.^88 Raids on such a scale were recorded by the advisers
themselves only a year later. Israeli reports on the October clashes mentioned an
Eg yptian soldier who was killed in one encounter. His comrades carried his body
back with them part way to the canal, but then had to abandon it and took only his
weapon—which appears to indicate there were only four to six raiders as described
by Serkov, rather than a platoon-size force.^89 But Israeli “observers” warned that the
latest incidents might be “a prelude to a Russian–Eg yptian attempt to cross the canal
in force.”^90 This Israeli assessment was echoed in Western reports.^91
The exaggerated Israeli description was in effect a backhand compliment to the
Soviets’ training and morale-building program, which was described in Israel as being
conducted “on the Panfilov model” of baptism-by-fire.^92 Analyses by “authoritative
western sources” held as usual that “by heating up the canal Nasser is trying to draw
the USSR into intervention. Certainly the duel improved home-front morale and
Nasser’s political position. It also provided training.”^93 But there were now opposite
readings too, whereby “Nasser had been put up to it by his Russian advisers,” and
these again suggested that the Soviets did so “as a warm-up for an attempt to clear the
Suez by force.”
In fact, despite the improvement in Eg yptian performance, Malashenko recom-
mended that the exercise not be repeated—by implication, until the shortcomings
were corrected. Indeed, no initiative on such a scale was undertaken by the Eg yptians
for the following five months. In Israel, this was attributed to the IDF’s forceful
response. The Suez refinery—rebuilt with Soviet aid after its destruction a year ear-
lier—had been spared in September, reportedly for fear of harming Soviet person-
nel.^94 Now it was again struck and damaged by Israeli artillery, using Soviet-made
multiple rocket launchers that had been captured in Sinai in 1967.^95
The IDF’s predictable response came in for unusual press criticism, some of it
apparently inspired by dissent within the military. Besides recriminations that the
IDF had twice been caught off guard, doubts were expressed about its knee-jerk retali-
ation in kind. “There is nothing wrong with shelling economic targets, but it is not
very effectual in stopping attacks, as Eg ypt is willing to pay the price, whereas the
casualties are too heavy for Israel. It is Eg ypt that needs to be surprised by a new form
of Israeli response.”^96
The new tendency in IDF thinking was exemplified five days later, when heliborne
Israeli troops carried out the first raid of its kind in the Eg yptian hinterland. Unlike
official Eg yptian announcements that admitted only an air raid, the Soviet advisers
confirmed a “well planned and executed” commando operation that struck at Nile
bridges and an electric installation at Nag Hammadi, midway between Cairo and
Aswan.^97 Serkov noted that this “delivered a serious warning to the Eg yptian leadership,”
but the effects were felt more on the home front than along the canal. There was a