7
FACING THE BAR-LEV LINE
A. The lull that enabled the strongpoints: lapse or reorganization?
It is generally accepted that the bombardments of 8 September and 26 October 1968,
and the casualties they caused, settled a year-long debate within the IDF top brass.
Between proponents of “static” and “mobile” defense strategies along the canal front,
the decision now went in favor of the former (or, as its supporters would claim after
its failure in 1973, a hybrid formula that only leaned toward their approach). Despite
domestic criticism of unpreparedness for the “second surprise,” work to harden the
outposts did begin after the first—as proved by a civilian worker who was among the
fatalities in October.^1 But the formal decision was finalized, and large-scale construc-
tion was begun, only afterward.
Some accounts hold that the Eg yptians failed to notice or fully appreciate the
substantive change in the Israeli defense concept until January. On 12 November,
Serkov did observe that “capital fortifications” were beginning to replace the Israelis’
ramshackle observation posts on the canal. Soviet thinking, however, still held that
“the Israelis’ main defense fortifications and forces are deep inland, in order not to
expose them to artillery fire, and consist of mobile formations capable of providing
sufficient time for main forces to arrive and deploy”—the very strateg y that Israel had
now altered if not abandoned. So Soviet-Eg yptian initiated “heavy artillery exchanges
were less frequent.”^2 This also reflected Malashenko’s recommendation, based on his
staff ’s critique of the 26 October operation, that it should not be repeated on the
same scale.
Previous studies suggested that the Eg yptians delayed action against the Israeli
fortification effort as they were “awaiting vital shipments of Soviet equipment.”^3
Malashenko clarifies that this refers to materiel for two entire new divisions, which
had been requested during the 1968 Grechko–Gromyko visit and approved in
Moscow soon after.^4 They were to form the nucleus of a new III Army Corps, as part
of a reorganization that the Soviet team had outlined. The advisers had found that
entrusting the entire canal front to the II Army Corps alone was unwieldy and inef-
ficient. Preparations for this restructuring had begun “a few months” before the